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Fast growing communities have found an increased need for the expan-
sion of their public facilities.' This has initiated numerous citizen com-
plaints, usually by older and more established residents, which have
been in the form of objections to higher taxes to pay for services and
facilities for new residents.2 As a result, local officials have increas-
ingly attempted to place the burden of bearing the construction cost of
new facilities on developers. Florida, as a high growth area, is a repre-
sentative example.3 The burdens placed on developers usually take
one of three forms: rezoning accompanied by certain conditions,
mandatory dedications of land to governmental units, or an impact fee.
1. The U.S. Bureau of the Census has indicated that Alaska, Arizona, Califor-
nia, Florida, Nevada, and Texas are states with the top projected percentage growth
and top projected growth in raw numbers of people during 1970 to 1976.
Raw Numbers of
Rank State %Growth Rank State Growth
I Alaska 27% 1 Florida 1,630,000
2 Florida 24% 2 California 1,567,000
3 Nevada 24% 3 Texas 1,290,000
4 Arizona 20% 4 Arizona 498,000
2. E.g.-Chirstian Science Monitor, June 12, 1979 at 13, col. 2-3 comments on
Citrus County, Florida growth.
3. Based on figures from the University of Florida, Bureau of Economic and
Business Research, Division of Population Studies and the U.S. Bureau of the Census,
the growth of the following counties is the greatest of Florida's 67 counties. Future
service needs will most likely be the greatest in these counties. (Note: The growth that
has already occurred in many counties has already exceeded some of these numbers.)
County 1970 Census Up% Projected 1980 Census
Broward 620,000 63% 1,016,000
Charlotte 27,000 114% 51,000
Citrus 19,200 142% 48,000
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In Florida, the impact fee has received increased attention by munici-
pal officials who are constantly searching for new, as well as increased,
revenue sources.
4
Naturally, the impact fee concept has aroused public attention.'
The fees seem to range from a low of $1256 to a high of $13,000 per
housing unit. The impact fee is a national phenomenum, and it has
been enacted in cities and counties from Petaluma, California' to West
Palm Beach, Florida?
1 138
Collier
Dade
Gilchrist
Hernando
Lee
Marion
Martin
Manatee
Okeechobee
Osceola
Palm Beach
Pasco
St. Lucie
Sarasota
Seminole
32,100
38,000
1,307,000
3,600
17,000
105,200
69,000
28,000
97,100
11,200
25,300
349,000
76,000
50,800
120,000
83,700
81%
113%
18%
83%
123%
89%
60%
110%
71%
74%
60%
76%
103%
57%
50%
82%
58,000
81,000
1,548,000
6,600
38,000
199,000
114,000
59,000
136,000
19,500
40,400
536,100
155,200
78,000
180,000
153,000
4. The cities of Dunedin, Clearwater, Gulf Breeze, Jacksonville, Maitland, and
Tallahassee and the counties of Dade, Broward, and Palm Beach are examples of those
Florida cities and counties that have attempted to enact impact ordinances.
5. Cf Fort Lauderdale News, October 25, 1978 at 2B, col. 3; Fort Lauderdale
News, June 13, 1979 at 20A, col. 1; San Diego Evening Tribune, August 25, 1978 at
Fl, col. 3; Palm Beach Post, August 17, 1978, at 15A, cole 1; Fort Lauderdale News,
August 31, 1978 at 18A, col. 1; Fort Lauderdale News, November 3, 1978 at 3B,
col. 1, 2.
6. Perlmutter's Inc. v. Ancell, 385 P.2d 123 (Colo. 1963) reh den.
7. Address by Prof. J. Nicholas, Impact Fee Conference, State Association of
County Commissioners (SACC) (June 13, 1979).
8. Petaluma, California, Ordinance 1311 (June 30, 1978).
9. Palm Beach County, Florida, Ordinance 79-7 (June 19, 1979).
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There are many reasons for the fee. Perhaps one of the most dras-
tic examples was illustrated in a recent circuit court decision in Dade
County, Florida in Marca, S.A. v. Dade County." March, S.A., a
Panamanian corporation, requested rezoning of 320 acres from agricul-
tural to permit varying degrees of residential development for an over-
all density of 3.5 units per acre. Marca, S.A. agreed to donate
$135,000 and eleven (11) acres of land for off-site improvements which
had become necessary due to the proposed development's impact on
the community. However, county planning officials estimated that even
if the County carried a 75% cost burden of $7,298,000, the developers
would still be required to donate between $435,000 and $534,000 to
completely cover the cost of off-site improvements." Thus, there was a
shortfall in available funding for necessary facilities such as roads,
schools, and water/sewer system expansion. The developers would be
required to donate at least an additional quarter of a million dollars
over their original donation, but the County would have to obtain $7.3
million of its own funds.'2 Not only did the County lack the funds, but
they did not anticipate any development in the area until at least 1985,
according to the County's land use plan. 3
Dade County turned down the rezoning primarily because the re-
zoning would cause increased burdens on an already over-burdened
school system. 4 The court concluded that these problems pre-existed
the rezoning application and therefore, "inaction on the part of those
who are responsible for providing already needed public service and
facilities should not be an obstacle to natural growth." The decision
was described as one of grave importance to County planners" because
it virtually forces a government to permit growth even if that govern-
ment can ill afford the burden. The local news media called for an
appeal of the decision, and noted that the logic of this case "denies any
possibility of sound land use planning."' 7 Eventually, the Dade County
10. No. 78-410AP (Fla. 11th Cir. Ct. May 31, 1979).
11. Dade County, Florida Environmental Impact Committee Report (September
21, 1978) at 2.
12. Id.
13. Id. at 3.
14. See note 10 supra at 2.
15. Id. at 4.
16. Address by Jerry Knight, Asst. General Counsel for Broward County, Flor-
ida, Impact Fee Conference, supra note 7.
17. Miami Herald, June 15, 1979 at 6A, col. 1.
4:1980
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Commission approved the rezoning in exchange for a withdrawal of
the decision on the developer's part."8 Marca, S.A. is a drastic example
of how the need for immediate additional revenue is caused by in-
creased development. The impact fee is a vehicle for supplying those
additional funds.
Other reasons for the fee have been given. They are:
1) new users should pay for the cost of the improvements their pres-
ence necessitates;
2) existing residents shouldn't pay for the needs of new residents;
3) an immediate need for expanded services for new residents is created
when they arrive, while there is a "time lag" before the increased tax
base they create becomes available to local officials;
4) developers, without such a fee, will almost never pay the full cost for
services they receive while reaping a windfall profit. 9
Conversely, the impact fee is not "lilly white." It has been viewed
as a hidden tax and an attempt by environmentalists to cause a con-
struction slowdown by adding on extra cost, resulting in a decreased
consumer ability to afford housing." This is especially significant in
view of the fact that 75% of the United States population cannot afford
a single family home.21 Certainly additional costs might help depress
the housing market, if, for example, the fees were as high as the
$13,000 fee in Newport Beach, California. However, the argument is
quite a bit weaker when the fee is $300, as in the case of Palm Beach
County, Florida.22 Whatever position individuals take in regard to this
fee, there is no escaping the fact that increased population growth will
require increased expenditures by local government to expand existing
facilities. New and expanded sources will most likely be a vital
necessity.
PURPOSE AND HISTORY OF FLORIDA IMPACT
FEE LAWS
Fees or dedication laws have been introduced in the Florida legis-
18. Miami Herald, July 23, 1979 at 6A, col. 1-2.
19. Report of Palm Beach County Commission Vice-Chairman Dennis Koehler
(June, 1979) at 1-3.
20. Id.
21. Id. at 2.
22. Palm Beach County, Florida, Ordinance 79-7, supra note 9.
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lature or as local ordinances. Legislative intentions have centered
around the creation of enabling acts which would afford local govern-
mental units an opportunity to enact their own ordinances. House Bill
837,23 introduced in 1975, was the only bill ever to successfully pass the
scrutiny of one committee in the Legislature.24 Over the years, there
have been four (4) measures introduced,2 but to date the Legislature
has never passed an enabling act.2 House Bill 837 specifically recog-
nized "that growth imposes costs on local government in providing es-
sential services and facilities." ' The purpose of this bill was to allow
jurisdictions to meet their needs and accommodate orderly growth by
passing the cost of new facilities onto the developer and new re-
sidents.21 The bill's author apparently perceived that the bill might as-
sist developers by eliminating the need for the type of development or
construction moratoriums that had been experienced in the past to al-
low local entities to "catch up" in the provision of services.29
Local ordinances have had a greater success in Florida, since the
state supreme court approved a water and sewer impact fee concept in
Contractors and Builders Association of Pinellas County v. City of
23. Fla. H.B.-837, 1975 Sess. (1975) was introduced by former State Representa-
tive Charles Boyd (D-Pembroke Pines).
24. Fla. H.B.-837 passed the House Committee on Community Affairs on April
24, 1975 probably due to the fact that Representative Boyd was chairman of that com-
mittee. The bill subsequently died in the House Committee on Finance & Taxation.
25. Fla. H.B.-3126, 1974 Sess. (1974) by Representative Boyd died in the
House Committee on Community Affairs. Fla. H.B.-743, 1975 Sess. (1975) intro-
duced by Representative Mary Ellen Hawkins (R-Naples) died in the House Commit-
tee on Community Affairs. Fla. S.B.-1263, 1975 Sess. (1975) by Senator K. "Buddy"
MacKay (D-Ocala) died in the Seante Commerce Committee. The bill was similar to
H.B.-837, supra note 24.
26. There are many reasons why the Legislature has never enacted an enabling
act to permit local governments to enact an impact fee. The International City Man-
agement Association notes that state officials are skeptical about local ability to man-
age local financial resources, and states like to preserve revenue sources for their own
use. See INTERNATIONAL CITY MANAGEMENT ASSOCIATION, MANAGEMENT POLICIES IN
LOCAL GOVERNMENT FINANCE (1976) at 12.
27. Fla. H.B.-837, supra note 24, sec. 2.
28. Specifically exempted from the bill's effect were private, municipal, and rural
utility systems.
29. During 1974 Representative Boyd's home county, Broward County, enacted
a temporary moratorium on the issuance of new building permits in an effort to give
the county a chance to "catch up" with development in the provision of new facilities
for new subdivisions. The moratorium also gave planners and environmentalists an
opportunity to effect a new county land use plan.
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Dunedin.3" Prior Florida efforts had all been dismissed by Florida
courts for one reason or another." The most notable effort which was
frustrated by the courts was in the form of a road construction impact
fee enacted by the Broward County Commission in 1973.11 The purpose
of the ordinance was to lessen traffic congestion, provide funds for road
construction, and promote the public health, safety, and general wel-
fare.? Although the County Commission did not elaborate on the pur-
pose of its enactment, as did State Representative Charles Boyd in
House Bill 837, it was apparent that the fee was aimed at new residents
who would generate an increased need for roads.
The latest impact efforts are taking place in Broward and Palm
Beach Counties in the form of road construction fees. 4 The most con-
troversial ordinance is the Palm Beach County ordinance which is cur-
rently being litigated. 5 This ordinance38 states that the County Com-
mission has determined a need for a $2.5 billion road construction
program just to maintain the status quo in road services. This is exclu-
sive of road right-of-way acquisition necessary to widen roads. The
legislative intent notes that it is only a part of a master finance plan,
and that it will generate only a portion of the necessary funds for road
construction. 7 The drafter placed language in the ordinance that spe-
cifically limits its effectiveness to pay the cost of road construction ne-
cessitated by new residents who pay the fee."8 Because of the recent
30. 329 So.2d 314 (Fla. 1976) reh den. This fee was affirmed using a water/
sewer regulatory statute as authority. Fees for other purposes will not be able to rely
on this statute as authority.
31. See Carlann Shores, Inc. v. City of Gulf Breeze, 26 Fla. Supp. 94 (Santa
Rosa Cir. Ct. 1966), Admiral Development Corp. v. City of Maitland, 267 So.2d 960
(Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1972), Venditti-Siravo, Inc. v. City of Hollywood, 39 Fla.
Supp. 121 (17th Cir. Ct. 1973), and Broward County v. Janis Development Corp., 311
So.2d 371 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1975). See also note 255, infra..
32. See Broward County v. Janis Development Corp., 311 S.2d 371, supra.
33. Id. at 372 n. 1, sec.2.
34. Palm Beach County, Florida, Ordinance 79-7 (1979), supra note 9.
35. Home Builders & Contractors of Palm Beach County, Inc. v. Palm Beach
County, No. 79-3281 CA(L)01 (Fla. 15th Cir. Ct., filed Aug. 15, 1979).
36. Palm Beach County, Florida, Ordinance 79-7, supra note 9.
37. This appears to subtly suggest a tie to economic planning which is called for
in FLA. STAT. § 163.3177 (2), (3) (1977).
38. See Dunedin, 329 So.2d at 321. The Court noted that fees collected from
new residents could only be used to benefit those new residents by the expansion of
public facilities to serve those new residents. Compare the Palm Beach County concept
to the language in Broward County, Florida Ordinance 73-2, § 5 (May 7, 1973) which
was invalidated in and may be observed in Janis, supra at 373.
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growth in Palm Beach County, the purpose of the ordinance contained
language geared to bolster the need for such an ordinance; "All land
development is deemed to create a traffic impact and therefore create
a demand for increased road capacity."39 In addition, the intent of the
ordinance indicates a strong reliance on the county's police power, as
legislative authority to enact the "fair share contribution"4 or impact
fee ordinance. The measure provides that increasing road capacity will
make transportation safer and more efficient, thus promoting the pub-
lic health, safety, and welfare.
This appears to mirror the concepts behind House Bill 837, since
both pieces of legislation indicate that the public health, safety, and
welfare will be promoted by regulating land development in order to
facilitate orderly growth. Because of this reliance on the police power,
it appears to the author that the fee could be a type of regulatory de-
vice used to hold back growth and development rather than provide for
well planned growth. Additionally, review of various pieces of legisla-
tion introduced in the Florida Legislature and a sampling of local ordi-
nanes indicate there are three publicly stated purposes behind impact
exactions.4 Primarily, they attempt to hold down local taxes by mak-
ing new residents pay for expanded facilities that they cause to be
needed.42 Secondarily, they are land use control mechanisms, in that
they assure at least a portion of the capital expansion funds needed for
new facilities will be available to local government.43 Thirdly, due to
such language as appears in House Bill 837, there is evidence that im-
pact ordinances are geared to manage the economy in such a way as
to avoid construction moratoriums which cause severe unemployment
in the construction industry while local government attempts to "catch
up" with the growth that has already occurred."
REZONING: CONTRACTS AND EXACTIONS
While various jurisdictions have struggled with mandatory dedica-
39. Palm Beach County, Florida, Ordinance 79-7, supra note 9.
40. The Palm Beach County ordinance is actually referred to as a "fair share
contribution fee," but it is an impact fee. See Palm Beach County, Fla., Ordinance
79-7, § I.A., supra note 9.
41. See note 25 and Palm Beach County, Florida, Ordinance 79-7, supra, note 9.
42. Fla. H.B.-837, § 2, 1975 Sess. (1975).
43. Palm Beach County, Florida, Ordinance 79-7, § 2 (g), supra, note 9.
44. Fla. H.B.-837, § 2, 1975 Sess. (1975).
J m
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tions and impact fees, others have attempted to exact certain guaran-
tees and dedications from developers as a prerequisite to adopting a
rezoning ordinance which the proposed construction project requires.
There are problems with this approach because it involves "dicker-
ing" 45 between planning and zoning officials and developers. "Dicker-
ing" has been judicially restrained because it is a key element in con-
tract zoning, which involves rezoning of land by zoning officials in
exchange for the filing of restrictive covenants by developers and land
owners that affect the subject property." Accordingly, an attack on the
validity of the rezoning measure may be made in the courts on the
basis that the measure was a form of contract zoning. This means that
any agreement reached between the zoning officials and the developer
would be totally invalid. Approximately twelve state tribunals, includ-
ing Florida, have ruled against this practice. 7 In Hartnett v. Austin48
the Burdines Department Store chain attempted to purchase Austin's
land for a new department store. A Dade County, Florida municipality
refused to rezone the land, unless the store would agree to a number
of conditions. 9 Florida's highest court said this constituted contract
zoning.
A municipality has no authority to enter into a private contract with a
property owner for the amendment of a zoning ordinance subject to vari-
ous terms, covenants, and restrictions in a collateral deed or agreement
to be executed between the city and the property owner."
While expanding on the Hartnett opinion, a Florida appellate court
indicated that a governmental entity which does contract with a land-
45. "Dickering" is a term used in the vernacular. It means to carry on lively
negotiations leading to a deal, agreement, or contract.
46. 2 ANDERSON, AMERICAN LAW OF ZONING, § 9.21 (2nd ed. 1976).
47. See State ex rel. Zupancic v. Schimenz, (46 Wis. 2d 22, 174 N.W. 2d 533,
537 (1970), Bucholz v. City of Omaha, 174 Neb. 862, 120 N.W.2d 270, 277 (1963),
and City of Knoxville v. Ambrister, 196 Tenn. 1, 263 S.W.2d 528 (1953).
48. 93 So.2d 86 (Fla. 1956).
49. The conditions included: 1) building a wall to seaprate the proposed center
from a nearby residential area, 2) protection of the residential area from any glare or
other disturbances, 3) providing a 40 foot set back, 4) landscaping the setback, and
5) paying for police protection.
50. Hartnett, 93 So.2d at 89.
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owner will find its contract to be invalid as an ultra vires act.51 Thus,
the landowner's restrictions will be void, but the rezoned land will not
be returned to its original zoning. The courts allow this since the rezon-
ing never could have occurred in the first place, if it weren't done for
the public health, safety, and welfare of the community."2
In essence, the general national rule is that "a municipality cannot
contract away the exercise of its police powers . . . .In the exercise of
this governmental function a city cannot legislate by contract."53 Simi-
larly, other arguments have been leveled against contract zoning.54 For
example, Scrutton v. County of Sacramento" attacked this form of
zoning as spot zoning. Spot zoning has been defined as "the process of
singling out a small parcel of land for a use classification totally differ-
ent from that of the surrounding area, for the benefit of the owner of
such property and to the detriment of other owners. 'Spot zoning' is
the very antithesis of planned zoning."5 The apparent view in Scrutton
is that, if the neighborhood changed, then the isolated rezoned use is
spot zoning. The California Supreme Court stated that, "that kind of
zoning is valid when long term changes in the neighborhood have cre-
ated conditions compatible with the proposed new use." 57 However,
Goffinett v. County of Christian,8 an Illinois appellate court opinion,
notes that there is a correlation between the size of the rezoned tract
and spot zoning.
In Goffinett, a 236-acre tract was rezoned and found not to be a
case of spot zoning, even though the rezoning seemed peculiarly out of
place for the area (a gas works facility located in the midst of an Illi-
nois agricultural area). The court cited an example of a rezoning in an
unnamed case in which 14.6 acres in Illinois probably represented the
largest tract in the nation judicially declared to be a case of spot zon-
51. See New Products Corp. v. City of North Miami, 241 So.2d 451 (Fla. 3rd
Dist. Ct. App. 1970) reh den.
52. Id.
53. 93 So.2d at 89.
54. See Kennedy, Contract and Conditional Zoning: A Toolfor Zoning Flexibil-
ity, 53 HASTINGS L.J. 825 (1972).
55. 275 Cal. App.2d 412, 79 Cal. Rptr. 872 (1969).
56. 2 ANDERSON, AMERICAN LAW OF ZONING, § 5.08 (2d ed. 1976). In Florida,
see: Bd. of County Commissioners v. Lowas, 348 So.2d 13 (Fla. 3rd Dist. Ct. App.
1977) and Miles v. Dade County, 260 So.2d 553 (Fla. 3rd Dist. Ct. App. 1972).
57. Scrutton, 79 Cal. Rptr. at 878.
58. 30 Il1. App.3d 1089, 333 N.E.2d 731, 737 (1975).
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ing.59 Therefore, spot zoning is usually viewed as a small tract rezoned
in a highly unusual way in comparison to the rest of the neighborhood
On appeal, the Supreme Court of Illinois affirmed the appellate deci-
sion,60 and reaffirmed an old standard by stating:
that although it did not encourage inconsistent zoning of small parcels of
land, it would not declare every reclassification of a single tract void ipso
facto. The test was to determine whether the change was in the property
in that locality, and the size of the parcel would only be one factor to
consider."
The Hartnett decision points out another problem with contract
zoning in that a municipal ordinance must be "clear, definite, and cer-
tain in terms;" otherwise it is invalid. In Hartnett, Justice Thornal ex-
pressed the view that "the provisions of a municipal ordinance which
conditions its effectiveness upon the necessity for the subsequent execu-
tion of a contract with private parties . . . cannot be held to provide
the degree of clarity and certainty required of municipal legislation."6 2
However, there appears to be a different method to accomplish the
same result as contract zoning without actually violating the rule
against contract zoning. It has been suggested that the actual rezoning
ordinance should not incorporate any restrictive agreements or condi-
tional promises to rezone. Rather, the landowner prior to the rezoning
should record the necessary restrictive covenants and create a domi-
nant estate in the municipality.3
Another approach that governments have utilized to skirt the rule
against contract zoning is the vehicle of conditional zoning. One au-
thority defines conditional zoning as an amendment to a zoning ordi-
nance which "permits a use of particular property in a zoning district
subject to restrictions other than those applicable to all land similarly
classed. ... "" The notable difference between this approach and con-
tract zoning is that there is no agreement by the governmental body to
rezone the subject property. 5 The express bilateral agreement between
59. See 333 N.E.2d at 737.
60. 65 Ill. 2d 40, 2 I11. Dec. 275, 357 N.E.2d 442 (1976).
61. Id. at 449.
62. 93 So.2d at 88.
63. Note, Contract Zoning, 24 ME. L. REv. 263, 272-73 (1972).
64. 2 ANDERSON, AMERICAN LAW OF ZONING, § 9.20 (2nd ed. 1976).
65. Land Use-Goffinett v. County of Christian: New Flexibility in Illinois Zon-
ing Law, 8 Lov. L. J. 642 (1977).
• ° ^ ^ .
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the governing body and a landowner is not only the cornerstone of con-
tract zoning, but it is the key point that differentiates contract zoning
from conditional zoning. 6 The idea of conditional zoning is similar to
a method of circumventing the no contract rule approved in Zupancic
v. Schimenz.67 Here, the Wisconsin Supreme Court approved a rezon-
ing in which the land developers and surrounding property owners ne-
gotiated and entered into an agreement limiting the use of the devel-
oper's land and vesting enforcement rights in the City of Milwaukee.
The court viewed the city as merely a third party beneficiary of the
agreement. The significant point in this case is that the court echoed
the Hartnett restrictions against contract zoning while approving the
above plan.6"
Since the use of any of the methods discussed above results in the
local governmental entity obtaining the type of restrictions it wants,
this author believes that any of these arrangements act as an induce-
ment to a local governing body to rezone the subject property. One
commentator notes that such an "agreement has blurred the legislative
judgment of the municipality or that such a process is likely to lead to
official misconduct."69 However, the same commentator goes on to
point out that this proposition is unfounded, because the rezoning ordi-
nance is passed with the same police power and is subject to the same
reasonableness test as other zoning ordinances." Notably, it appears
that the key distinguishing point in Florida under the Hartnett decision
between illegal contract zoning and a legal rezoning arrangement may
be reached if the developer files his restrictive covenants prior to the
official rezoning action.7 1
The concept of filing restrictive covenants to induce local officials
to rezone a-piece of property will probably survive an attack based on
illegality due to contract zoning. This viewpoint is arguably based on
Broward County v. Griffey. 2 The Griffeys owned a large tract of land
west of Fort Lauderdale, Florida on which they wished to construct a
high density 1700 unit apartment complex. To construct the complex
the property needed to be rezoned. The County Commission deferred
66. Id. at 643.
67. 46 Wis. 2d 22, 174 N.W.2d 533 (1970).
68. Id. at 537.
69. Kennedy, supra note 54 at 834.
70. Id.
71. 93 So.2d at 88-89.
72. 366 So.2d 869 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1979).
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action on the rezoning proposal pending a number of stipulations
which included dedication of land for right-of-way for road construc-
tion. The Griffeys dedicated the land, and the Commission approved
the rezoning shortly thereafter. However, due to contractor problems
the project was never constructed. Years later the Commission decided
to "down-zone" 7 3 the land pursuant to a new land use plan. The Grif-
feys attached this by arguing that the whole rezoning was illegal as
contract zoning. They sought the return of their previously dedicated
right-of-way. The trial court agreed, but the appellate court reversed
by stating that the dedication was merely an inducement to receive
favorable county action on the rezoning proposal." The court appar-
ently ignored any negotiationg between the Griffeys and the County
Commission that culminated in an oral agreement to rezone the land in
consideration of a right-of-way dedication. The court even cited Hart-
nett as authority, noting that no written contracts were negotiated;
therefore, the County did not bargain away its police power.75 Thus, it
appears that it is possible for developers to negotiate the rezoning of
land in exchange for dedications of land78 and presumably for aid in
financing the construction of public facilities.
AUTHORITY FOR IMPACT FEE ORDINANCES
The pitfalls of conditional and contract zoning can be overcome
by a newer approach involving mandatory land dedications or impact
fees. An advantage of the impact fee ordinance is that developers will
pay for the growth that they generate, and in planning for their new
developments, developers will be able to compute the fees or dedica-
tions that local government will require in exchange for approval to
develop. While it is readily apparent that such an ordinance will allow
73. "Downzoning" as used in this text means to lower the overall permitted use
and/or density of a particular piece of land.
74. 366 So.2d at 870.
75. Id. at 871.
76. While Florida has one of the strongest policies in the nation against contract
zoning, there appears to be one curious deviation from the rule. It is suggested that this
deviation would not be a reliable citation to support a cause in a Florida courtroom. In
Herr v. City of St. Petersburg, 114 So.2d 171 (Fla. 1959) reh den, the Florida Su-
preme Court approved the City's contract to rezone without even mentioning Hartnett.
The City contracted to exchange railroad land (tracks) running though the downtown
area that the City obtained by eminent domain. Part of the bargain called for new land
to be rezoned for the railroad in exchange for the downtown land.
Y
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local government to expand its basic resources without an increase in
ad valorem taxes or without bonding,77 developers have been successful
in avoiding enactment of these ordinances in many instances. 78 This
trend appears to be changing based on various theories, such as the
Voluntary Dedication and Economic Benefit Theories and various
Relationship Tests, that have -been adopted by various jurisdictions
governments in Florida for two reasons. Merely obtaining the land as
A. Voluntary Dedication
Closely related to the covenanting and conditional zoning con-
cept 0 is the idea of exchanging plat approvals for the dedication of
land by a developer for school, park or road facilities. Historically, this
concept has been upheld by virtue of the leading case: Billings Proper-
ties, Inc. v. Yellowstone County."' The Montana Supreme Court ruled
that this concept could be based on the zoning police power, 2 assuming
that the dedication was judicially viewed as voluntary on the part of the
developer. 3 However, this approach would not serve the needs of local
governments in Florida for two reasons. Merely obtaining the land as
a dedication for roads, schools or parks would never meet the costs
necessary for park or school development, much less road construction.
Therefore, the dedication would have to be coupled with some other
type of financing program. Also, because of the manner in which Flor-
ida has been developing, large tracts of undeveloped land have already
been platted. Thus, dedication on a voluntary basis would be virtually
nonexistent in many areas. This situation will surely continue, because
77. An example of the need for bonding is attributable to the lack of an impact
ordinance in Broward County, Florida. In 1975, a 1973 road impact fee ordinance
was invalidated in Janis, supra, note 31. The County's political structure was unable to
raise its ad valorem tax rate to raise capital needed for new facilities due to fear of
political fallout, since the county had a conservative political structure. On September
12, 1978, county voters were compelled to approve a $125,000,000 road bond and
$73,000,000 parks and recreation bond package, as part of a $256,000,000 bond propo-
sal. This was due to the severe lack of recreational and road facilities.
78. Almost all suits challenging impact ordinances in Florida have been brought
by developers.
79. Florida may be one of those states. See text accompanying notes 107-1 12,
258, and 259.
80. 394 P.2d at 186.
81. 144 Mont. 25, 394 P.2d 182 (1964).
82. Id. at 186.
*83. Id.
4:1980
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it is part of the cyclical nature of land speculation that has become
firmly implanted in Florida.4
B. Economic Benefit Theory
This theory is based on the concept that development of one's land
is a privilege and not a right.85 While this argument may be faulty,"6 the
land taken under a mandatory dedication or impact exaction will be
utilized for the public health, safety, and welfare. The public facilities
that will be available will enhance the value of the develoer's project.
Cases have supported this concept, most notably Jordan v. Me-
nomonee Falls.87 The Wisconsin Supreme Court approved an impact
exaction in which the Village of Menomonee Falls sought a land dedi-
cation from a developer before granting approval for development. The
Court noted that the dedication would be used for public facilities and
thus enhance the development making it more valuable." Also, the
dedication was found to assist in satisfying the demands created by the
developer's activities, namely increasing the need for public facilities
cause by the related population growth.
Another representative case is Associated Home Builders of
Greater East Bay, Inc. v. City of Walnut Creek.8" This case is particu-
larly notable, because the developer attached a local ordinance enacted
by Walnut Creek, California pursuant to a state impact fee enabling
act. 0 Associated Home Builders"1 involved an attempt by local authori-
ties to force a land dedication for park purposes, which resulted in an
action for inverse condemnation. Both the police power and the eco-
nomic benefit theory were cited by the California Supreme Court in its
84. See Maloney, Frank E.; Fernandez, Dan; Parrish, Anthony R., Jr.;
Reinders, James M., Public Beach Access: A Guaranteed Place to Spread Your Towel,
29 U. FLA. L. REV. 853, 872 (1977).
85. See Landau, Eliot A., Urban Concentration and Land Exactions for Recre-
ational Use: Some Constitutional Problems in Mandatory Dedication Ordinances in
Iowa, 22 DRAKE L. REv. 71, 81 (1972).
86. Id. at 81-82.
87. 28 Wis. 2d 608, 137 N.W.2d 42 442 (1965) appeal dismissed 385 U.S. 4, 17
L.Ed.2d 3, 87 S.Ct. 36 (1969).
88. 137 N.W. 2d at 448.
89. 4 Cal.3d 633, 94 Cal. Rptr. 630, 484 P.2d 606 (1971) appeal dismissed 404
U.S. 878, 30 L.Ed.2d 159, 92 S.Ct. 202 (1971).
90. See Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code, §§ 66477 and 66479 (West, 1975).
91. 484 P.2d 606.
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opinion approving Walnut Creek's action. While it appears that there
is authority supporting the use of this theory to substantiate impact
exaction ordinances, no Florida Court has approved the economic ben-
efit theory to date. However, the late Judge Nathan, in an appellate
opinion, did make a remark that at least appears to be receptive to the
theory when he stated, ". .. [a]nd in a very real sense, the subdivider
profits from the conditions imposed on him, since the provision of
safety and health requirements benefits potential buyers, thus rendering
the lost of the subdivision more attractive."
C. The Relationship Tests
Three tests have been developed by various judicial authorities to
review and substantiate impact fees and/or mandatory land dedica-
tions. The foundation of all three concepts lies in the police power. The
particular statutory authority delegating the police power in Florida
will be examined below, but first, it is essential to understand the three
relationship tests that determine to what extent the police power may
be applied as an exaction. The essence of the three tests rests on the
view that the developer will be compelled to provide public systems as
a cost of developing. This will occur only when the developer's project
causes a need for new systems. Thus, the tests relate to the amount a
governmental unit may exact from a developer for new facilities to the
amount of need created for those new facilities from the developer's
activities. The three tests range from pro-municipality to pro-developer
in their application.
1. THE REASONABLE RELATIONSHIP TEST
The reasonable relationship test is the oldest of the three tests. In
Ayres v. City Council of the City of Los Angeles," a developer was
ordered to dedicate an eighty foot strip of land for an extension of a
street in exchange for approval of the development. The developer at-
tacked the mandatory dedication as an unreasonable taking without
compensation. However, in 1949, the California Supreme Court ruled
92. Wald Corp. v. Metropolitan Dade County, 338 So.2d 863, 867 (Fla. 3rd
Dist. Ct. App. 1976) cert den 348 So.2d 955 (Fla. 1977).
93. 34 Cal.2d 31, 207 P.2d 1 (1949).
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that the eighty foot dedication was reasonable even though the street to
be extended only had a width of sixty feet.94 The Court noted that a
municipality may substantiate its taking when it shows that the taking
is "reasonably related" to the needs of the community. 5 This test
allows a local governmental entity such flexibility in its exaction that a
court would have to uphold the taking "short of gross abuse," ac-
cording to a Florida court. As a result this approach is unacceptable
in Florida, since this concept places the burden of proof totally upon
the developer to prove that the exaction is reasonable. The Wald
decision notes that:
while such wide latitude is routinely accorded in other areas of police
power regulation, required dedication as a condition for approval for
subdivision plats stands in derogation of constitutionally protected
property rights. Thus, it is imperative that some sort of standard be
imposed which will not allow virtually unbridled interference with pri-
vate property.97
2. THE SPECIFICALLY AND UNIQUELY ATTRIBUTABLE TEST
The second test which developed is essentially an intension of the
reasonably related test. The test is rooted in a pair of Illinois deci-
sions. In the first decision, Rosen v. Village of Downers Grove,9" two
plaintiffs, Herman Rosen and Firestone Realty, wanted to subdivide a
tract of land into fifty-two lots. The Village Planning Commission ap-
proved the plat only after the company agreed to pay $325 per lot into
an escrow account for future construction of schools in the Village.
The Court cited the Ayres" test, but instead of using the term "reason-
ably related", the Court utilized a new terminology to describe the
proper application of the police power. That term was "specifically and
94. 207 P.2d at 6.
95. For a current example of the reasonably related test in action see Frisco
Land & Mining Co. v. State, 74 Cal. App.3d 736, 141 Cal. Rptr. 820 (1977). In this
case the court indicated that a dedication could be forced by a municipality, even if
that dedication was not related to a need created by the subdivision. The dedication
need only be designed to benefit the public. The case involved dedications of easements
to beach property for the use of the public.
96. Wald, 338 So.2d at 865.
97. Id. at 866.
98. 19 Ill.2d 448, 167 N.E.2d 230 (1960).
99. 207 P.2d 1.
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uniquely attributable." ' The enactment of the fee ordinance in Down-
er's Grove was found to be broader than the authority delegated by the
Illinois Legislature. The Illinois Supreme Court focused on this con-
cept a year later in Pioneer Trust and Savings Bank v. Village of
Mount Prospect.'0 ' In this case, the plaintiff sought to develop a tract
of land with two-hundred fifty residential units. The Village of Mount
Prospect used a platting ordinance to compel dedication of 6.7 acres of
land for an elementary school. The Court referred to the Rosen deci-
sion and invalidated the application of the ordinance by indicating that
the developer should not be forced to pay the fee, since the construc-
tion would not generate the need for a new elementary school. The
need for the new school would apparently be generated only to a
smaller degree by the developer. Thus, community needs were not
"specifically and uniquely attributable" to the developer's activities.0 2
Under this test, it appears that a court will validate an exaction only if
the increased need is solely attributable to the activities of the devel-
oper. The test is considered to be so stringent that the local govern-
mental entity has the entire burden of proving that the exaction is
valid. Therefore, this test has an effect that is opposite to that of the
reasonably related test.'
Florida court decisions have been somewhat inconsistent so far,
but some of the earlier decisions approve the specifically and uniquely
attributable test. In Carlann Shores, Inc. v. City of Gulf Breeze, °4 a
Florida Circuit Court first took note of this test and approved it. The
City of Gulf Breeze enacted an ordinance which required land subdi-
viders to dedicate 5% of their land or pay a fee equal to 5% of the
valuation of the land in their project to the City for park purposes.
Since the plaintiff refused to abide by the ordinance, the City voted to
reject the plan for development. The Court found for the plaintiff and
approved the specifically and uniquely attributable test by citing Pio-
neer Trust. °5 In Admiral Development Corp. v. City of Maitland' a
100. 167 N.E.2d at 233-34.
101. 22 Ill.2d 375, 176 N.E.2d 799 (1961) reh. den.
102. Id.
103. 338 So.2d 863.
104. 26 Fla. Supp. 94 (Santa Rosa Cir. Ct. 1966).
105. Id. at 96.
106. 267 So.2d 860 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1972) reh den.
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dedication ordinance that was virtually identical to the Gulf Breeze or-
dinance came into question. Although the Fourth District Court of
Appeals referred to the Carlann Shores case, it did not approve or even
mention the specifically and uniquely attributable test. It did, however,
invalidate the Maitland ordinance. 0 7
The Third District Court of Appeal has indicated in Wald"0 8 that
this test is not appropriate in Florida, stating that the
... approach advocated by Pioneer Trust disallows a formidable
method of subdivision control, which is an integral part of comprehen-
sive planning. And while it is important to guard against unbridled mu-
nicipal discretion, it is equally important that those who propose to sub-
divide may be subjected to rational dedication requirements. 9
Nonetheless, the specifically and uniquely attributable test has survived
and remains the rule in Illinois."' The test is viewed as being so strict
that one commentator has noted that "if anything is acceptable in Illi-
nois, this usually means that it is not likely to run into great trouble
elsewhere." '
3. THE RATIONAL NExus TEST
The case of Wald Corporation v. Metropolitan Dade County' 2 in-
107. The court found that the city could only rely on its charter, as an enabling
statute for authority to secure exactions.
108. 338 So.2d 863.
109. Id. at 867.
110. In Board of Education of School District No. 68, DuPage County v. Surety
Developers, Inc., 63 I1l.2d 193, 347 N.E.2d 149 (1975) reh den (1976) the defendant
developer constructed a development which contained 1400 new resident elementary
school children. DuPage County was able to predict the growth in the number of ele-
mentary school children based on the proposal for the subdivision. The county impact
fee required a $50,000 construction contribution, land dedication, and an additional fee
of $200 per unit home for development of a new school. The court approved this fee by
pointing out that 98% of the students in the new school would be from the new devel-
opment. The "specifically and uniquely attributable" test had been satisfied. See also
the latest approval in Illinois of this test in Krughoff v. City of Napierville, 68 Ill.2d
352, 369 N.E.2d 892 (1977).
111. 3 ANDERSON, AMERICAN LAW OF ZONING, § 156.08a (Supp. 1977).
112. 338 So.2d 863.
o
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dicates that Florida is probably a rational nexus state."' The author
feels that Wald is one of the two most significant cases n the nation
that deals with this test. Here, a developer sought approval of a plat
from the Dade County Commission. The subdivision was in the
"glades" area of West Dade County. Apparently, the land was low-
lying and subject to flooding unless proper drainage facilities were
available. The County agreed to approve the plat only if the developer
would dedicate land for a drainage canal and an easement for canal
maintenance purposes. The developer refused and claimed that the
forced dedication was an unconstitutional taking. Noting the absence
of any appellate cases on point in Florida, the Court, in an outstand-
ing opinion, discussed all three relationship tests."' However, the tribu-
nal used an analogy between the use of the police power in impact
exactions and in regulating outdoor advertising by citing the Florida
Supreme Court decision in Eskind v. City of Vero Beach.", Eskind
stands for the proposition that private business could not be subjected
to police power restrictions where there was no reasonably identifiable
rational relationship between the demand of public welfare and the re-
straint upon private business.""' It is this decision's reference to a "ra-
tional relationship" that the Wald Corporation Court analogized to the
rational nexus test. The Court binds the "rational relationship" con-
cept to subdivision control through a discussion by a leading commen-
tator.
The subdivider is a manufacturer, processer[sic], and marketer of a
product; land is but one of his raw materials. In subdivision control dis-
putes, the developer is not defending hearth and home against the king's
intrusion, but simply attempting to maximize his profits from the sale
of a finished product. As applied to him, subdivision control exactions
are actually business regulations." 7
The Court attempted to indicate that there must be an identifiable rela-
tionship between the demands of the public welfare and the restraint
113. Id. at 867-68.
114. Id. at 867.
115. 159 So.2d 209 (Fla. 1963).
116. Id. at 212.
117. Johnston, John J., Jr., Constitutionality of Subdivision Control Exactions:
The Quest for a Rationale, 52 CORNELL L. Q. 871, 923 (1967).
155 114:1980
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placed upon the developer who merely represents private business. In a
very real sense, this is the moderate approach to the application of the
police power. It is nestled somewhere between the extremes of the rea-
sonably related test and the specifically and uniquely attributable test.
"It allows the local authorities to implement future-oriented compre-
hensive planning without according undue dererence to legislative judg-
ments. It requires a balancing of the prospective needs of the commu-
nity and the property rights of the developer."18
While Wald derives its importance from the fact that it compares
the three relationship tests, the other case of national significance is the
case of Land/Vest Properties, Inc. v. Town of Plainfield."9 In this
case, the New Hampshire Supreme Court adopted the rational nexus
approach and carefully dissected the test. Land/Vest Properties, Inc.
owned two tracts of land in Plainfield, New Hampshire. The company
proposed to subdivide the land into lots ranging in size from fifteen to
ninety-six acres. The town planning board agreed to approve the pro-
posal provided that the developer improve two poorly paved roads into
quality highways. Two points were particularly notable about these
roads. Both of the roads were primarily outside the town limits, and
both served a few other lot owners and residents, although the roads
did lead to and terminate inside the Land/Vest property. The town
planning board was rebuffed by Land/Vest, and the town attempted to
uphold its plan for exacting the road improvements from the developer
by utilizing a "but-for" type of test."' The roads in their improved
state would not be needed "but-for" the Land/Vest subdivision, ac-
cording to the Town. The Supreme Court noted that the roads did need
to be improved, because "an emergency would create a hazard for ac-
cess due to their present condition. Increased traffic from the plaintiff's
proposed . . . lots would also increase the present danger."12' How-
ever, the Court noted that other property owners and residents in the
area would be benefiting at the expense of Land/Vest. This contrasts
with the Wald project, because it appears that only the Wald Corpora-
tion and the public as a whole would benefit by having the drainage
system available. The New Hampshire Court then applied the rational
118. 338 So.2d at 868.
119. 117 N.H. 817, 379 A.2d 200 (1977).
120. Id. at 203.
121. Id. at 202.
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nexus approach by noting that a balancing of factors was essential. The
Court stated that the Town of Plainfield only balanced the "burden
imposed on the town by the subdivision against the burden imposed on
the subdivider by the town's precondition for subdivision approval."',
It was absolutely essential to give consideration to the benefits in such
a balancing of factors, according to the Court's interpretation of the
rational nexus test.'?
Citing a section of the New Hampshire Constitution that had been
construed to allow the taking of a person's property only "on the im-
plied condition . . . that (the landowner) is to receive a just compensa-
tion,"124 the Court compared the situation to a case of special assess-
ments which are highly analogous to impact exactions.'2 "Special
assessment upon property for the cost of public improvements are in
violation of our Constitution, if they are in substantial excess of the
(equivalent in special) benefits received." 12 In essence, then, the Court
states that the benefits must be considered in the balancing test and
"the subdivider can be compelled only to bear that portion of the cost
which bears a rational nexus to the needs created by, and (special) ben-
efits conferred upon, the subdivision."1
Thus, the rational nexus test attaches the burden of proof to both
the developer and the local governmental entity. The local government
will have to substantiate that the developer's activities are causing a
need for expanded facilities while the developer will have to prove the
municipality or county wrong. 12 The author feels that it may well be
122. Id. at 204 (emphasis added).
123. Id. (euiphasis added).
124. Id. citing Great Falls Manufacturing Co. v. Fernald, 47 N.H. 444, 445
(1867).
125. Id. at 204.
126. Id. citing Manchester v. Straw, 86 N.Y. 390, 169 A. 592, 593 (N.H. 1933),
citing White v. Gove, 183 Mass. 333, 67 N.E. 359, 360 (1903).
127. Id. citing Longridge Builders, Inc. v. Planning Bd. of Princeton Twp., 52
N.J. 348, 245 A.2d 336, 337 (1968).
128. Contrast this with the wording in Home Builders Ass'n. v. City of Kansas
City, 555 S.W. 2d 832, 835 (Mo. 1977) reh den approving a test sounding like the
rational nexus test and finding that the burden of justification of an impact fee ordi-
nance was not on the governing body. The point here is that a developer's objection to
an impact fee can take two forms: 1) the ordinace is unreasonable or 2) the amount of
exaction caused by the formula in the ordinance is unreasonable. The rational nexus
test apparently allows the developer to put the burden of substantiating the amount of
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implicit in the developer's proof of what is wrong that the developer
should be required to prove what is right. This is because some type of
dedication or payment of a fee will eventually be required. However,
the test is also crucial in that a developer will be compelled to dedicate
land or pay cash for improvements only to the extent that his develop-
ment will generate a need for those new facilities. The idea that the
needs must be solely attributable to the developer under the specifically
and uniquely attributable test is rejected, because the developer will
pay for only what he causes to be needed. This concept is apparently
embodied in the Wald decision and explained in Land/Vest. However,
it can be contrasted with the Florida Supreme Court's holding on exac-
tions in Dunedin."' Without mentioning the rational nexus approach,
the Court viewed the City of Dunedin's hike in water and sewer system
connection charges under an approach that sounds arguably like the
rational nexus test.
Raising expansion capital by setting connection charges, which do not
exceed a pro rata share of reasonably anticipated costs of expansion, is
permissible where expansion is reasonably required ..... The cost of
new facilities should be borne by new users to the extent new use requires
new facilities, but only to that extent. 30
It should be reiterated that the Dunedin decision also limits the "use of
the money collected . . . to meeting the costs . .. , of the particular
project.
a. The Excessive Hardship Corollary to the Rational Nexus Rule
The rational nexus rule appears to have a strange twist in the form
of what the author believes may be termed the excessive harship corol-
exaction but not the reasonableness of the ordinance on the governing body. This case
shows the confusion over this issue. The majority viewed the trial court as in error
because it tried to make the City justify the overall reasonableness of the ordinance. In
Kansas City, Id. at 836 (Finch, J., dissenting) the dissent found that very possibly the
trial court was trying to force the governing body to justify the amount of exaction.
Contrast this perception as to burden of proof with Wald, supra note 92.
129. 329 So.2d at 314.
130. Id. at 320-21.
131. Id. at 320.
_ .
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lary. This concept is rooted in dicta in the Land/Vest Properties1 2
case, and it points out why this case is one of two rational nexus cases
of national significance. In this case, the New Hampshire Supreme
Court cited a state planning statute"' which is very similar to a Florida
planning statutelu in that both laws look forward to comprehensive
land use planning in a financially stable and cost effective way.'- The
Court then went on to discuss the interrelation between this statute and
the rational nexus test by indicating that the test was flexible enough to
deal with "a town . . . faced with such an 'excessive expenditure',
(that) its otherwise 'fair share' of the cost may be adjusted to accom-
modate the municipality's ability to pay."'' The Court seems to be
saying that a developer, under the rational nexus test, might be re-
quired to pay for a greater amount of public facilities than his subdivi-
sion might be causing a need for. The rationale is that "without this
limitation, a private developer could single-handedly require an in-
crease in the municipal tax burden."' 37
Why does the rational nexus test lead to this conclusion? This is
apparently because a small community with a small tax base and lim-
ited public facilities might experience enough growth from a large de-
velopment to generate the need for expanded facilities. However, the
practical and cost efficient method for the community to expand its
facilities might be to build larger facilities than would be immediately
needed. An example will help to illustrate this fact. Assume a develop-
ment's projected growth within a seven (7) year period might indicate a
need for a new water plant that could pump 1,000,000 gallons of water
daily. However, the plan for this development calls for it to be con-
structed in phases or segments. The first phase to be built is to be as-
sessed under the rational nexus test for funds that will enable the mu-
nicipality to build a plant that will pump 200,000 gallons of water
daily. Platting or pulling of building permits for additional phases of
the project might not be planned for a few years under the development
132. 379 A.2d 200.
133. N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 36:21 (supp. 1975).
134. See FLA. STAT. Ch. 163 (1977).
135. Compare the New Hampshire statute in note 126 with FLA. STAT. §§
163.260 (2) (b), (d), and (i) (1969).
136. 379 A.2d at 205.
137. Id.
14:1980 Impact Fees 159 1
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plan. At this point the municipality has three options. The first option
is to assess the developer for what can be legally exacted: funds for the
200,000 gallon per day plant. Then the city would build the plant. As
the developer plats later phases of his development and pulls building
permits on those phases additional rational nexus assessments would
be made. The water plant would be expanded to serve those new seg-
ments or phases. However, the plant will be more expensive when built
in this manner. Costs will increase due to inflation. Also, it may be
more expensive in constant dollars to expand the facility than it would
have been to construct the complete 1,000,000 gallon per day facility in
the first place from an architectural and engineering standpoint. This
means that the developer who is being assessed for this construction
will end up paying more in the end in impact fees.
The second option would have been simply to assess the fee for the
200,000 gallon plant and raise the taxes of local residents or bond (with
accompanying interest costs) to build the entire 1,000,000 gallon per
day plant. This method would be cheaper, but it runs afoul of the ratio-
nale for impact fees, as expressed above in Dunedin.3 8 Simply put the
rationale asks why older residents should pay for new facilities that are
needed to serve new residents. The third -option is to apply the Landl
Vest "excessive hardship corollary." Under this theory the developer
would pay more than might normally be permitted under the rational
nexus test. Obviously, such an assessment might be rare and would be
totally dependent on the facts.
It is significant to note that while no Florida court has mentioned
the "excessive hardship" concept, the Dunedin"' decision has alluded
to it by sustaining a fee and relying, in part, on the same rationale as
the New Hampshire Court utilized in sustaining the "excessive hard-
ship corollary.""14 In Dunedin, Justice Hatchett stated that, "we see no
reason to require that a municipality resort to deficit financing, in or-
der to raise capital by means of utility rates and charges. On the con-
trary, sound public policy militates against such inflexibility."'4 In ap-
proving an impact fee in this case, it appears that the Florida Supreme
Court ruled out the alternative of compelling a municipality to raise its
138. See note 130.
139. 329 So.2d 314.
140. 379 A.2d at 205.
141. 329 So.2d at 319-20.
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ad valorem taxes in order to avoid deficit financing."' This is in effect
precisely what the New Hampshire Court did in arguing for the exces-
sive hardship corollary.
Furthermore, it is arguable that there is statutory authority in
Florida to authorize this corollary. A section of the Intergovernmental
Programs Chapter in the Florida Statutes states:
(2) The regulation of the subdivision of land is intended: . . . (i) To
insure that the citizens and the taxpayers of incorporated municipalities
and counties will not have to bear the costs resulting from haphazard
subdivision of land and the lack of authority to require installation by
the developer of adequate and necessary physical improvements."'
In any event the New Hampshire Supreme Court indicates that this
approach should be (one) used sparingly and only in an effort "to pre-
clude 'danger or injury to health, safety, or prosperity . . ., ",.
Without this caveat or corollary to the rational nexus rule, a private
developer might compel an increase in the municipal tax burden.
b. The Balancing Test Factors
While both the Wald Corporation"5 and the Land/Vest Proper-
ties46 cases call for a careful balancing test "of the prospective needs
of the community and the property rights of the developer," only
Land/Vest suggests any specific factors to be considered in the balanc-
ing. The Land/Vest case involved two roads that led to the developer's
tract of land. In fact, only 950 feet out of 10,000 feet of roadway
fronted on the developer's land. The trial court applied a so called
"proportionality" test which assessed the developer based only on his
proportionate share of front footage on the road (9.5%). 14 The New
Hampshire Supreme Court rejected this test as too narrow to be con-
sidered by itself. Instead, the Court considered a "nonexhuastive cate-
gorization of such factors," including: 1) the standard of maintenance
142. See note 130.
143. FLA. STAT. § 163.260 (2) (i) (1969).
144. Id.
145. 338 So.2d at 868.
146. 379 A.2d at 204-05.
147. 338 So.2d at 868.
148. 379 A.2d 200.
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of similar roadways in the town; 2) the potential traffic increase that
would result due to the new development; 3) the character and poten-
tial for development of the neighborhood served by these access roads;
and, 4) the number of residents living or or normally trafficking these
roads.' In essence, "no single factor can be determinative of the ap-
propriate mode of apportionment . . of costs under the rational
nexus test.
D. Application of Florida's Police Power
While the rational nexus test appears to be favored in Florida,
another key problem is finding statutory authority for enacting an im-
pact ordinance. The Florida Supreme Court, in Dunedin, 15 had little
problem, since the water and sewer fees exacted in that case were en-
acted under a Florida law that permitted rates or charges for water/
sewer hookups."' It appears that the police power is the most viable
authority that has been delegated to the local level which could be re-
lied upon to support an impact fee. A review of this authority should
be viewed from the perspective of three types of local governmental en-
tities. The basic outline of power for charter 53 and non-charter 54 coun-
ties and municipalities'55 is noted in the Florida Constitution. Municipali-
ties are guided by their charters which allow them full governmental,
corporate, and proprietary powers not inconsistent with state law.'56
Municipalities may carry out any "municipal purpose."' 57 A "munici-
pal purpose" is any "activity or power which may be exercised by the
state or its political subdivisions."'5 Thus, a municipality has the pow-
ers of the state's political subdivisions and its own corporate powers. A
charter county has extensive local self-government powers including
149. Id. at 205.
150. Id.
151. 329 So.2d at 319.
152. FLA. STAT. § 180.13 (2) (1973).
153. FLA. CONST. of 1968 art. VIII, § 1 (g). See also FLA. STAT. § 125.86 (7), (8)
(1974) and FLA. STAT. § 163.210 (1969).
154. FLA. CONST. of 1968 art. VIII, § 1 (f).
155. FLA. CONST. of 1968 art. VIII, § 2 (b). See also FLA. STAT. §§ 163.031,
163.210, and 166.021 (1969).
156. See note 155.
157. FLA. STAT. § 166.021 (1969).
158. Id.
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power to enact special, local laws with the approval of the particular
county's electorate. 5 It has the power to alter its structure by abolish-
ing certain elective constitutional county offices.6 0
Perhaps the most restrictive entity of the three is the non-
charter county. The reason for this restraint was expressed most
clearly by the Florida Supreme Court in Keggin v. Hillsborough
County.61
A county is a political subdivision of the state. Article 8, secs. 1, 2,
Const. 1885. It is not a corporation. It may be created by the state with-
out the solicitation, consent, or concurrence of the inhabitants, of the
territory, thus setting it apart; it is created for administrative purposes; it
is the representative of the sovereignty of the state, auxiliary to it, an aid
to the more convenient administration of the government. It is purely
political in nature, constituting the machinery and essential agency by
and through which many of the powers of the state are exercised . 2
The non-charter county is totally subservient to the Legislature, and
its only "functions relative to the health, convenience, and welfare of
the public" is "in the county, particularly outside of municipalities." '
County functions may only be under express or implied statutory au-
thority, assuming there are no contrary provisions of law.'" As a result
of this restraint, the remainder of this section will focus on the power
of the non-charter county.
Chapters 125 and 163 of the Florida Statutes appear to be key
chapters that delegate sufficient police power for local efforts in enact-
159. See note 153.
160. FLA. CONST. of 1968 art. VIII, § I (d).
161. 71 Fla. 356, 71 So. 372 (1916).
162. Id. at 372.
163. Duval County v. Bancroft, 96 Fla. 128, 129, 117 So. 799, 800 (Fla. 1928).
1928).
"164. Id., but see Amos v. Mathews, 126 So. 308, 321 (Fla. 1930) which states:
While a county in the performance of certain functions is an agency or arm of
the state, it is also something more than that . . . .While the county is an
agency of the state, it is also under our Constitution to some extent at least, an
autonomous, self-governing, political entity with respect to exclusively local af-
fairs, in performance of which functions it is distinguished from its creator, the
state, and for its acts and obligations when acting in purely local matters the
state is not responsible. (emphasis added).
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ing an impact ordinance utilizing the rational nexus approach.'65 In
some cases, other jurisdictions have approved impact fee ordinances
based on statutory authority that is remarkably similar to language in
the Florida Statutes. 6' Underlying this entire discussion is the fact that
zoning power and statutory zoning schemes of most states are similar
because a majority are based on the Standard State Zoning Enabling
Act.167
Florida Statutes Chapter 125.01 is entitled "Powers and Duties"'6
of counties. This section states that: "(1) The legislative and governing
body of a county shall have the power to carry on county government.
To the extent not inconsistent with general or special law, this power
shall include, but shall not be resricted to the power to: . . . ." This
preamble to the enumeration of county powers seems sweeping, but a
look at the manner in which Florida courts have interpreted it does not
reflect its plain meaning.66
1. STRICT CONSTRUCTIONIST vs. THE PERMISSIVE VIEW
The interpretation of this clause has been the subject of coritinuing
litigation.70 According to the permissive viewpoint, the clause seems to
indicate that, if the Legislature hasn't usurped the subject area by legis-
lating or prohibiting it by law, it is a permissible county function.' 7' On
the other hand, strict constructionists might argue that a non-charter
county is merely a child of the state and can only derive specific
powers through legislative delegation of authority.172 The strict con-
165. Interview with Warren Dill, Deputy County Attorney, Palm Beach County,
Florida, in West Palm Beach, Florida (August 9, 1978).
166. See, 379 A.2d 200 and Jordan, 137 N.W.2d 442, infra note 213.
167. ANDERSON, AMERICAN LAW OF ZONING, § 26.01 (1968).
168. (emphasis added) This section provides the basic power for all counties. It is
the foundation of power for the charter, as well as the non-charter counties. Approxi-
mately sixty of Florida's sixty-seven counties are non-charter counties.
169. See note 172, infra.
170. Id.
171. Individuals such as the county attorneys or county commissioners would
probably support this view.
172. See such cases as Davis v. Gronemeyer, 251 So.2d I (Fla. 1971); State ex
rel. Volusia County v. Dickinson, 269 So.2d 9 (Fla. 1972); Gessner v. Del-Air Corp.,
17 So.2d 522 (Fla. 1944).
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structionist view has its roots in many cases,' but it is typified by the
dissent of Justice Hal Dekle in Orange County V. State."' This case
involved the power of Orange County, a non-charter county, to issue
capital improvement bonds without approval of the electorate. The
case discussed two key sections of the Florida Constitution.'75 One of
the sections, Article VIII, sub-section 1 (f), is virtually identical in lan-
guage to the preamble of Chapter 125.01 (1). It states that non-charter
governments "have such power of self-government as is provided by
general or special law . *"... '" However, the same section limits that
power such that the non-charter government may enact "county ordi-
nances not inconsistent with general or special law."'77 Justice Dekle
persuasively argues that the permissive viewpoint taken by county offi-
cials is not really an interpretation of power but actually an enlarge-
ment of power."7 "It not only wipes out the obvious distinction be-
tween the two forms of government (charter and non-charter govern-
ment) but in one fell swoop it authorizes all counties over the state
to proceed arbitrarily . . . as they see fit, without voter or legislative
approval, but as a virtual independent sovereign, which they are
not."'79
However, it can be argued that, even if non-charter power is "in-
terpreted" or "enlarged" to encompass the permissive viewpoint, the
differences between charter and non-charter counties would not be to-
tally obliterated. For example, a charter county's duly enacted ordi-
nances may prevail over any municipality's ordinances, depending on
the wording of the particular county's charter. 8 However, if the ordi-
nances of a non-charter county and a municipality are in conflict, the
173. Id.
174. 281 So.2d 310 (Fla. 1973) (Dekle, J., dissenting).
175. FLA. CONST. OF 1968 art. VIII, § l(f) and (g).
176. FLA. CONST. OF 1968 art. VIII, § I (f).
177. This section was placed in the 1968 Constitution to expand local govern-
ment home rule. During the mid-sixties, record numbers of local bills were being filed
in the Florida Legislature, culminating in 1967 with hundreds of bills. The Legislature
was becoming so bogged down with local legislation that home rule had to be granted.
Note that this section is very similar in verbage to Fla. Stat. § 125.01 (1) (1977).
178. 281 So.2d at 314.
179. Id.
180. FLA. CONST. OF 1968 Art. VIII, § I (g).
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municipality's ordinance shall prevail within its corporate limits.,', In
fact, in Palm Beach County, a recently enacted impact fee was nullified
within the corporate limits of a number of municipalities which decided
to "opt out" of the ordinance."' Another crucial difference that re-
mains between the charter and non-charter counties is the ability of the
former to restructure their government.1' 3 An e:xample is Broward
County, Florida. Under its charter, it made the post of tax collector an
appointive position which is an elected constitutional officer in most
other counties. Broward County also increased its five (5) person
County Commission to a seven (7) member body.'84
Justice Dekle, in Orange County, clearly states that, "it is not a
matter of proceeding unless precluded but is a matter of proceeding
provided by law, as to a non-charter county . . . ."11 He noted that
the Florida Constitutional section (and apparently the section quoted
above in F.S.§ 125.01 (1) ) is merely an implementing power for ordi-
nances when a particular power has been specifically granted by the
Legislature. 8 Oddly enough a counter-argument to this position can
be found by looking at the enumerated powers under Chapter 125.01
(1). One of the powers states that a county may "perform any other
acts not inconsistent with law which are in the common interest of the
people of the county, and exercise all powers and privileges not spe-
cifically prohibited by law."'8 7 Thus, the Legislature has specifically
granted a power to proceed unless precluded under the specifically
enumerated powers of this general law. Nonetheless, authority can be
181. Id. at § 1(f).
182. The cities of West Palm Beach, Lake Worth, Pahokee, Belle Glade, Lake
Clarke Shores, and North Palm Beach have all opted out of the fee. Palm Beach Post,
.July 16, 1979 at 4-5B, col. 4.
183. FLA. CONST. OF 1968 art. VIII, § I(d).
184. Cf. Broward County Charter (1973).
185. 281 So.2d at'314.
186. Id.
187. FLA. STAT. § 125.01 (1) (w) (1977). Justice Dekle in Orange County, supra
note 111, at 315 points to commentary by the Honorable Talbot D'Alemberte, a
drafter of the 1968 Constitution, as further authority for his arguments that Fla.
Const. of 1968 art. VIII, § 1 (f) was merely intended to allow non-charter counties to
enact ordinances pursuant to specifically granted powers by the Legislature. However,
the Legislature in FLA. STAT. § 125.01 (1)'s introductory clause and in FLA. STAT. §
125.01 (1) (w) seems to have specifically granted the power for non-charter counties to
proceed, so long as a law does not preclude their action.
166
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found in Janis Development Corp. v. City of Sunrise"s to argue that
this enumerated power does not grant the power to proceed unless pre-
cluded for a non-charter county, especially in enacting an impact fee.
This trial court opinion discusses a road impact fee that was enacted
under the authority of this particular enumerated power."8 9 The Court
noted in dicta that the fee or tax did not fall within the police power.
There was no other reason given as to why an impact fee could not
have been enacted under this particular enumerated power.
Perhaps the theory of ejusdem generis might arguably limit the
"proceed unless precluded" or permissive viewpoint of this enumerated
power."" This theory limits general words or phrases following an enu-
meration of specific things or powers to things of powers of the same
class or genus, as those comprehended by the preceeding specific
terms.' However, even this argument would be poor because the list
of county powers includes the power to zone and regulate business.'92
As will be discussed below, there is a direct tie between these powers
and impact fees. The struggle between the so-called permissive view
(proceeding unless precluded) and the strict constructionist argument
(typified by Justice Dekle's dissent in Orange County)' has encoun-
tered another battle, but this particular battle may have signalled the
end of the conflict. On March 5, 1979, the Florida Attorney General's
Office released an opinion that dealt with the powers of a non-charter
county.'94 Lee County (Fort Meyers), Florida had requested an opinion
on the legality of its plan to set up a human relations commission
based on Chapter 125 of the Florida Statutes. 9 ' The Attorney Gen-
eral's Office took the position enunciated by Justice Dekle and indi-
cated that the county has no authority to proceed, since there was no
express or implied statutory authority under any general or special law.
188. 40 Fla. Supp. 41, 59 (Fla. 17th Cir. Ct. 1973).
189. FLA. STAT. § 125.01 (1) (w) (1975).
190. This assumes that one must also adopt the view of Justice Dekle in the
Orange County case that the similar wording of FLA. CONST. of 1968 art. VIII, § I (f)
and the introductory clause to FLA. STAT. § 125.01 (1) are not a specific authorization
of power but rather merely an implementing power for specifically enumerated powers.
191. See 70 Op. Att'y. Gen. 19 at 4 (1979).
192. FLA. STAT. § 125.01 (1) (h) (1975).
193. 281 So.2d 310.
194. 79 Op. Att'y Gen. 19 (1979).
195. See also FLA. CONST. OF 1968 art. VIII, § 1 ().
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However, only one month earlier, the Florida Supreme Court had
issued an opinion adverse to the Attorney General's viewpoint in the case
of Speer v. Olson.9 ' Pasco County, Florida, a non-charter county, a
municipal service taxing district under the County Commission,
attempted to issue general obligation bonds for water and sewer facilities
by pledging future net revenues derived from the operation of the
facilities, as well as certain ad valorem taxes. Taxpayers brought suit
claiming there was no authority under state law for this action. The
County then sought to have the bonds validated. The Court noted that
there is no specific authority that authorizes or restricts a non-charter
county to issue general obligation bonds to acquire water and sewer
facilities and pledge system revenues and ad valorem taxes. 9, Justice
Adkins, writing for the majority, specifically noted that the first full
sentence of Chapter 125.01 (1) of the Florida Statutes ". . . therefore
empowers the county board to proceed under its home rule power to
accomplish this purpose." '98 He indicated that, "unless the Legislature
has pre-empted a particular subject relating to county government by
either general or special law, the county governing body, by reason of
this sentence, has full authority to act through the exercise of home
rule."'9 By virtue of this decision it appears that a non-charter county
can engage in virtually any county function, so long as there is no
preclusion in the Constitution or statutes. It is apparent that the
Attorney General's Office continues to maintain a different stance in this
matter, and thus, it is probable that we have not seen the last of the
continuing struggle of non-charter county powers.
2. OTHER ARGUMENTS
There are other arguments that might be raised concerning the
introductory clause of Chapter 125.01 (1) of the Florida Statutes.
These arguments seem to parallel the trend of thought embraced by the
permissive view. The clause states that county government "shall have
the power to carry on county government. To the extent not inconsis-
tent with general of special law . . . ."I What is meant by the two
196. 367 So.2d 207 (Fla. 1978) reh den (1979).
197. Id. at 211.
198. Id.
199. Id.
200. (emphasis added) FLA. STAT. § 125.01(1) (1977).
_ o
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tent with general or special law .... ."0 What is meant by the two
terms "county government" and "inconsistent"? One might argue that
"county government" is defined by the twenty-five (25) enumerated
powers listed in Chapter 125.01 (1). However, the introductory clause
of that very section also states that the power to carry on county gov-
ernment shall not be restricted to the enumerated powers."0' Thus, at
most, the enumerated powers merely provide examples or typify the
meaning of the term "county government." Another argument can be
found in Cable-Vision, Inc. v. Freeman."°' In this case, when Monroe
County sought to provide cable TV service," 3 the Court specifically
found that the County had the requisite power to do so, based on the
case of State v. Brevard County."' The Cable-Vision Court stated that,
"determination of what is a county purpose may be express or implied
in the provision of the ordinance (setting up the new county program).
The Courts will not interfere with such determination, unless it has no
legal or practical relationship to a valid county purpose. ' 205
Thus, according to Cable-Vision, a county may define what a
county governmental power is by ordinance. However, this 1975 opin-
ion by the Third District Court of Appeal may have overly enlarged
what the Florida Supreme Court actually stated in the Brevard County
case.201 The Florida Supreme Court found that, "what is a county pur-
pose may be determined by the express or implied provisions of a stat-
ute . . ." and not an ordinance.m Since statutes are enacted only by
the Legislature, it would appear that the Court meant that only the
Legislature could determine a county purpose. However, the use of the
word "may" in the above quotation doesn't necessarily indicate that
200. (emphasis added) FLA. STAT. § 125.01(1) (1977).
201. See also FLA. STAT. § 125.01 (3) (a) (1969).
202. 324 So.2d 149 (Fla. 3rd Dist. Ct. App. 1975) reh den (1976) appeal dis-
missed 429 U.S. 1032, 50 L.Ed.2d 743, 97 S.Ct. 723 (1976).
203. The Florida Keys stretch for 113 miles to the South and West from the
Florida mainland. The nearest television station is approximately 150 miles from the
furtherest populated Key, and cable TV is a virtual necessity for television reception.
204. 99 Fla. 226, 126 So. 353, 355 (1930).
205. 324 So.2d at 154.
206. 126 So. 353.
207. (emphasis added) See Brevard County, supra note 204, at 355. In Dade
County v. Pan American World Airways, Inc., 275 So.2d 505, 511 (Fla. 1973) reh den
the Florida Supreme Court reaffirmed the right of the Legislature to define a county
purpose.
1 4:1980
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the Supreme Court foreclosed a body other than the Legislature from
determining what is a county purpose.0 8 If the Cable-Vision view is
followed, a county could simply define that impact fees were a county
purpose, so long as that purpose was not "inconsistent" with state
law." 9 The term "inconsistent" was defined by the Florida Supreme
Court in Dade County v. A.R. Brautigam, 21  as meaning "contra-
dictory in the sense of legislative provisions which cannot exist." 21'
Since there seems to be no law dealing with impact fees specifically,
there is apparently no statute for an impact fee ordinance to
contradict.
A final argument concerns the reading of the enumerated powers.
The Florida Statutes indicate that reading of the powers is to be broad
with a liberal interpretation. 12 The question then arises, regarding im-
pact fee ordinances, how far might a tribunal go in construing the lib-
eralism clause in a police power statute? In Jordan v. Village of Me-
nomonee Falls213 a mandatory dedication ordinance was based on a
state statute that gave local governments the power to approve require-
ments for subdivisions. The statute authorized a municipality to ap-
prove the subdivision of parcels or ". . . provide other surveying,
monumenting, mapping, and approving requirements for such divi-
sion. 21 This statute is extremely similar to the regulating and zoning
authority in the Florida Statutes2 15 and was to be liberally interpreted,
208. Florida Power Corp. v. Pinellas Utility Bd., 40 So.2d 350, 354 (Fla. 1949),
reh den citing, State ex rel. Garrison v. Comm'rs of Putnam County, 23 Fla. 632, 3
So. 164 (1887).
209. See note 201 and accompanying text.
210. 224 So.2d 688, 692 (Fla. 1969).
211. The Court actually defined the term as used in FLA. CoNsr. OF 1968 art.
VIII, § 6 (f) which is analogous to FLA. STAT. § 125.01 (1) (1977): "(0-DADE
COUNTY-POWERS CONFERRED UPON MUNICIPALITIES: To the extent
not inconsistent with the powers of existing municipalities or general law.
212. FLA. STAT. § 125.01 (3) (b) (1969).
213. 28 Wis.2d 608, 137 N.W.2d 442 (1965) appeal dismissed 385 U.S. 4, 17
L.Ed.2d 3, 87 S. Ct. 33 (1966).
214. 137 N.W.2d at 446.
215. FLA. STAT. § 125.01 (1) (h) (1975):
(h) Establish, coordinate, and enforce zoning and such other business regula-
tions as are necessary for the protection of the public.
Recall the discussion in Wald, supra note 92, at 867 concerning impact fees being
analogous to a form of business regulation. See also FLA. STAT. §§ 163.165, 163.260
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according to state law.21 The Wisconsin Supreme Court permitted im-
pact exactions to be included within the local power to approve re-
quirements for subdivisions217 and indicated that the Wisconsin Legisla-
ture had delegated sufficient police power to allow municipal enactment
of an impact fee. A similar situation occurred in Frank Ansuini v. City
of Cranston21 1 when a developer, who owned a tract of land in Cran-
ston, Rhode Island, sougnt to improve his land. The City attempted to
exact a mandatory land dedication of land equal to 7% of the size of
the development .21 Although the Court overruled the dedication as
arbitrary,2 0 it did approve the concept of an impact exaction based on
implied authority from the statute,22' which delegated the police power
to municipalities to "adopt, modify, and amend rules and regulations
governing and restricting the platting or other subdivision of land in
such city or town. ' ' 2 2 Despite the fact that this statute appears to focus
on platting, it is quite analogous to Florida law.2 2
Another source of authority is Part II of Chapter 163 of the Flor-
ida Statutes which deals with comprehensive planning and land use
planning. This section appears to be more far reaching than Chapter
125 due to its concepts of cutting across city and county boundaries,
although they both are to be liberally viewed. 24 It provides authority to
both counties and cities, whereas Chapter 125 deals only with county
powers. There are numerous sections in Chapter 163 that appear to
give implied authority that verges on expressed authority for impact
exactions, some of which will be examined below. The legislature in-
tended the authority of Part II of Chapter 163 to be very broad in an
(1977).
216. 137 N.W.2d at 446.
217. Id. at 446-48.
218. 107 R.I. 163, 264 A.2d 910 (1970).
219. See Carlann Shores, supra note 104, and Admiral Development, supra note
106, for Florida cases with a similar factual situation.
220. 264 A.2d at 914.
221. R. I. GEN. LAWS § 45-23-2 (1956).
222. 137 N.W.2d at 446-48.
223. This is true, if the powers are liberally construed as is required by FLA.
STAT. § 125.01 (3) (b) (1969).
224. Cf. FLA. STAT. § 163.310 (1969): 163.310 Construction "This part shall be
liberally construed to promote the purposes for which it is intended except for the
penalty provisions, which shall be strictly constued against the commission or gov-
erning body."
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effort to give counties and municipalities the power to prevent or mini-
mize future problems, enhance present advantages in the community,
and overcome present handicaps in dealing with the growth that
Florida is undergoing."' Furthermore, the Legislature intended that
the express provisions of Part II of Chapter 163 are to be the minimum
requirements to promote the public health, safety, and welfareY
Notably, the scope of this chapter allows "the several counties and in-
corporated municipalities of this state . . . to . . .adopt, and enforce
subdivisionm regulations." 8 As part of the subdivision regulation pro-
225. FLA. STAT. § 163.165 (1) (1969): 163.165 Legislative intent
(1) In order to preserve and enhance their present advantages, overcome
their present handicaps, and prevent or minimize future problems, it is the intent
of this part to enable the several counties and incorporated municipalities to
plan for future development and to prepare, adopt and amend comprehensive
plans to guide future development, to implement the comprehensive plans, the
several counties and incorporated municipalities may adopt and enforce zoning
regulations, adopt and enforce subdivision regulations, and adopt and enforce
building, plumbing, electrical, gas, fire, safety, and sanitary codes.
Using Chapter 163 as a resource will require the non-charter counties to either adopt a
comprehensive plan or a resolution electing to operate under the provisions of that
chapter pursuant to FLA. STAT. § 163.315 (1969). See J.O. Townley v. Marion County,
343 So.2d 1312 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1977) reh. den.
226. Id. at 163.165 (2):
(2) The provisions of this part in its interpretation and application are de-
clared to be the minimum requirements necessary to promote, protect, and im-
prove the public health, safety, comfort, good order, appearance, convenience,
morals, and general welfare; to conserve the value of land, buildings, and re-
sources; and to protect the character and maintain the stability of residential,
agricultural, business, and industrial areas and to promote the orderly develop-
ment of such areas.
227. FLA. STAT. § 163.170 (7) (1969) defines a subdivision (apparently for devel-
opment purposes) as "the division of a parcel of land, whether improved or unim-
proved, into three or more contiguous lots or parcels of land .
228. FLA. STAT. § 163.160 (1) (1969):
163.160 Scope of part II
(1) The several counties and incorporated municipalities of this state may
plan for future development, adopt and amend comprehensive plans to guide
future development, adopt and enforce zoning regulations, adopt and enforce
subdivision regulations, adopt and enforce building, plumbing, electrical, gas,
fire, safety, and sanitary codes, and establish and maintain the boards and com-
missions herein described for carrying out the provisions and purposes of this
part. The powers authorized by this part may be employed by counties and in-
corporated municipalities individually or jointly by mutual agreement in accor-
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cess, planning commissions are to be set up.29 One of the powers and
duties of these planning commissions is to "(3) Establish principles and
policies guiding action in the development of the area."' ' 0 Local gov-
ernments are given authority to enact various subdivision regulations to
assist in guiding development.?' The statutory language used seems to
be based on thoughts similar to Representative Charles Boyd's House
Bill 837 regarding impact fees.?23 The police power delegated in this
section provides for "the harmonious, orderly, and progressive develop-
ment of land within Florida." The section of Chapter 163 which de-
dance with the provisions of this part in such combinations as their common
interests may dictate.
229. FLA. STAT. § 163.180 (1) (1969).
230. FLA. STAT. § 163.185 (3) (1969):
163.185 Functions, powers, and duties of commissions
The functions, powers, and duties of the commission shall be, in general and
in addition to any functions, powers and duties set forth in the body of this part,
to:
(3) Establish principles and policies for guiding action in the development
of the area.
231. FLA. STAT. § 163.260 (1) (1969):
163.260 Regulation of subdivisions; purposes
(I) The public health, safety, comfort, economy, order, appearance, conve-
nience, morals, and general welfare require the harmonious, orderly, and pro-
gressive development of land within Florida and its counties and incorporated
municipalities. In furtherance of this general purpose, counties and incorporated
municipalities, individually or in combination as authorized by this part, are au-
thorized and empowered to adopt, amend, or revise and enforce measures relat-
ing to land subdivision.
While an impact fee or mandatory land dedication ordinance could be enacted as
a subdivision regulation it appears, that the fee could be enacted as a pre-condition to a
plat approval. See FLA. STAT. §§ 177.011-.151 (1979). In fact "every plat of a subdivi-
sion filed for record must contain a dedication by the developer." FLA. STAT. § 177.081
(1979). The problem with using the plat approved-impact fee method is that land that
has already been platted will be able to be developed without payment of the fee. Also,
if the developer decided not to plat his land, the developer would not have to pay the
fee. A landowner can't be compelled to plat his land and to perform pre-conditions to
platting, as a pre-condition to sale or use, if the land is to be sold without reference to a
plat. This means the land would have to be sold with a legal description in metes and
bounds. Kass v. Lewin, 104 So.2d 572 (Fla. 1958). Nonetheless, Broward County, Florida
has a model impact fee ordinance exacting an impact fee as a pre-condition to a plat
approval. See Broward County Ordinance, § 5-192 (1979).
232. See notes 23, 24, and 27.
233. FLA. STAT. § 163.260 (1) (1969).
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fines the term "regulation of subdivision of land" includes eleven ele-
ments of which ten are particularly closely related to impact exactions,
depending upon the type of fed (e.g., school, road, water/sewer, etc.).
They are:
(a) To aid in the cooperation of land development in counties and in-
corporated municipalities in accordance with orderly physical patterns;
(b) To discourage haphazard, premature, uneconomic, or scattered
land development;
(c) To insure safe and convenient traffic control;
(d) To encourage development of economically stable and healthful
communities;
(e) To insure adequate utilities;
(g) To provide public open spaces for recreation;
(h) To insure land subdivision with installation of adequate and neces-
sary physical improvements;
(i) To insure that the citizens and taxpayers of incorporated municipal-
ities and counties will not have to bear the costs resulting from haphaz-
ard subdivision of land and the lack of authority to require installation
by the developer of adequate and necessary physical improvement;
(j) To insure to the purchaser of land in a subdivision that necessary
improvements of lasting quality have been installed, and
(k) To serve as one of several instruments of comprehensive plan im-
plementation authorized by this part.
Sub-sections (b) and (c) are particularly notable when viewed in
the overall text of this law. In Land/Vest Properties,231 the New
Hampshire Supreme Court approved the rational nexus test while re-
viewing a state law that provided town planning boards with the au-
thority to promulgate regulations which: "provide against such scat-
tered or premature subdivision of land as would involve danger or
injury to safety . . . by reasons of lack of. . .transportation . ..or
other public services, or necessitate an excessive expenditure of public
funds for the supply of such services."1 This section implied sufficient
authority for the New Hampshire Court to approve an impact exac-
234. FLA. STAT. § 163.260 (2) (1969); See also FLA. STAT. § 163.3161 (3) (1977).
235. 379 A.2d 200.
236. N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. 36:21 (Supp. 1975). See also and contrast FLA.
STAT. § 163.260 (2) (i) (1969).
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tion, yet it is not nearly as sweeping as sub-sections (b) and (c)
above.Dl Perhaps the best authority in Florida for an exaction is the
Wald Corporation case.28 Florida's Third District Court of Appeal not
only approved an exaction under the rational nexus test, but it found
authority based on concepts of comprehensive planning. The Court
noted that the rational nexus approach "allows the local authorities to
implement future-oriented comprehensive planning without according
undue deference to legislative judgments." 9
OPERATIVE ASPECTS OF IMPACT FEE
ORDINANCES
A. Tax vs. User/Regulatory Fees
While there arguably is authority under planning and various lo-
cal power acts to enact an impact fee there is still another problem that
may be encountered. The answer hinges on thf manner in which the
ordinance is drafted. The author believes that this may be one area in
which a fee could be successfully attacked, since the proper form of
implementation from an administrative standpoint has not been fully
litigated. In other words, if the fee is poorly implemented, it could be
overturned in court as a tax24 which raises two problems. First, the
Florida Constitution authorizes taxation by ad valorem tax or by gen-
eral law authorization only. 41 There are no general laws covering im-
237. But see City of Montgomery v. Crossroads Land Co., 355 So.2d 363 (Ala.
1978) specifically stating that Alabama municipalities do not have the power to exact a
fee or land dedication for parks from developers. (Id. at 365. There apparently is au-
thority permitting only dedication for recreational purposes inside a subdivision.) The
statute in question, ALA. CODE tit. 37, § 798 (Recomp. 1958), states a planning com-
mission shall adopt regulations governing land subdivision, inluding the provision of
open space for traffic, utilities, recreation, etc. Compare this with FLA. STAT. § 163.260
(2) (c) and (g) and 163.265 (1) (1969).
238. 338 So.2d 863.
239. Id. at 868. For a restrictive view of a planning statute that provides an
interesting contrast, see Cimarron Corp. v. Bd. of County Commissioners of the
County of El Paso, 563 P.2d 946 (Colo. 1977).
240. See Janis Development, supra note 31, and Venditti-Siravo, supra note 31.
241. See FLA. CONST. OF 1968 art. VII, § I (a) and 9 discussed in City of Tampa
v. Birdsong Motors, 261 So.2d I (Fla. 1972).
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pact taxation at the present time.242 A Florida Appellate Court in
Broward County v. Janis Development Corporation243 viewed the fee
as a tax. The Court found that impact fees were being collected from
new residents and placed into a general road construction fund, despite
some rather vague wording in the ordinance. Although the funds could
have been used to construct roads or improve existing roads by widen-
ing them in the areas where the fee-paying residents lived, there was no
restriction or definition of the size of the area to be served by the fees
collected. Apparently the Court viewed this fee as a tax because there
was not adequate assurance that the fee-payers would actually be the
true beneficiaries of the fee. Thus, the fee was held to be a tax; a levy
paid simply to raise revenue2 4 which caused the "fee" to be invali-
dated.24
In Haugen v. Gleason,ue a mandatory land dedication for parks
was enacted to exact land for park purposes from developers. Develop-
ers could pay a fee in lieu of a dedication, and this methodology was
also found to be a tax.247 While the case is not particularly timely, the
underlying rationale is still very valid. The Court found that the pri-
mary purpose of the ordinance was revenue generation rather than sub-
division regulation. This is apparently the dividing line between fees
and taxes; fees directly benefit those individuals who pay them while
taxes generate revenues that are used for the benefit of all. Both Janis
and Haugen objections were countered in Dunedin 4 where the Florida
Supreme Court determined that if the revenue is restricted to the use of
benefiting new residents for the purpose of expanding public facilities,
242. See notes 23 to 25. Bills discussed in those notes were introduced to give
specific authority for the enactment of impact fees.
243. 311 So.2d 371 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1975).
244. Id. at 375. In Aunt Hack Ridge Estates, Inc. v. Planning Commission of
Danbury, 27 Conn. Supp. 74, 230 A.2d 45 (1967), an impact fee was found to be a
tax, since the revenues were not specifically restricted to benefit new residents who
paid the fee.
245. It will be recalled that no tax can be implemented without a specific grant
of power from the Legislature. See FLA. CONST. OF 1968 art. VII, § I (a). There is no
grant of power to enact an impact "tax."
246. 226 Ore. 99, 359 P.2d 108 (1961).
247. The fee was enacted on the basis of the police power, as a function of a
comprehensive planning statute.
248. 329 So.2d 314.
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it is a fee rather than a tax. Yet, if new residents are charged a fair
pro rata share of the cost to benefit them directly by the expansion of
public facilities and without generating additional revenue, the exaction
is viewed as a fee.20
The second problem that is generated by viewing the exaction as a
tax is illustrated from another Broward County, Florida case. In
Venditti-Siravo, Inc. v. City of HollywooaF1 the City passed an ordi-
nance compelling payment of a fee, amounting to 1% of the cost of
construction of a project, to secure a building permit. The fee was to
be used for parks and recreation. Ten builders filed a class action suit
and a circuit court judge found the fee to be a tax on property. =2
Herein lies the second problem. Once the tax is viewed as an ad
valorem tax its effect would have to be added to the existing millage
rate. If the combined effect of the fee and the normal ad valorem tax
exceeded Florida's ten mill cap, Florida law would be violated. The tax
would have to be invalidated or at least reduced so as not to exceed the
ten mill levy.2 .1 Therefore, it is absolutely essential that the exaction be
viewed as a fee, and the Dunedin=' case appears to present the rule for
differentiating fees from taxes. However, that case does not tell us how
to properly implement the fee from an administrative viewpoint so that
the fee will not be viewed as a tax. For example, how do we know that
funds being paid are, judicially speaking, being used to directly benefit
the payors? If roads are built to serve a subdivision, but they are sel-
dom used by residents of that subdivision, are those new residents re-
249. Id. at 320-21.
250. Id. at 319-20. The Court appears to have noted that an exaction is a fee
rather than a tax when the exaction is not more than the cost of accommodating new
users. Local governments are simply seeking "to shift to the user expenses incurred on
his account. A private utility would presumably do the same thing in which event
surely even petitioners would not suggest that the private corporation was attempting
to levy a tax on its customers." Id. at 318-19. At 319 further on in the case, the court
stated that: "We see no reason to require that a municipality resort to deficit financing
in order to raise capital by means of utility rates and charges."
251. 39 Fla. Supp. 121 (Fla. 17th Cir. Ct. 1973).
252. Id. at 123.
253. Florida has had its own California-style Proposition 13 property tax limi-
tation for years. See FLA. STAT. § 200.071 (1969) which imposes a maximum
possible tax levy of no more than 10 mills for any county or district. FLA. STAT.
§ 200.081 (1969) enforces the same rule for municipalities.
254. 329 So.2d 314.
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ceiving a direct benefit from the roads that they paid impact fees for?2s
B. Trust Accounts
To insure that the revenues from an impact fee are not only col-
lected but spent for the expansion of public facilities to benefit those
individuals who contributed the funds, Dunedin" ' appears to require
that the funds be subjected to careful internal control by governmental
authorities. Justice Hatchett, writing for the majority, stated:
The failure to include necessary restrictions on the use of the fund is
bound to result in confusion, at best. City personnel may come and go
before the fund is exhausted, yet there is nothing in writing to guide their
use of the moneys, although certain uses, . . would undercut the legal
basis for the fund's existence. There is no justification for such casual
handling of public moneys . . .
The answer appears to be a trust fund."'8 The Palm Beach County
roadway impact fee utilizes this approach.us The ordinance envisions
the use of forty separate trust funds. Each fund will be used for road-
way work in forty separate geographical districts in the county. While
this may create an accountant's nightmare, it appears manageable, and
it will probably satisfy the Dunedin test for internal control of funds
after they are collected. This also might meet the test for distinguishing
between a tax and a fee, since the funds will be spent to benefit those
255. Florida governing bodies have excelled at drafting failures when it comes to
impact fees. These fees have all failed, because they were merely taxes. Cf Home
Builders and Contractors Assoc. of Palm Beach County, Inc. v. Village of Royal
Palm Beach, No. 78-2374 CA(L) OlD (Fla. 15th Cir. Ct. May 25, 1979); Home Build-
ers Ass'n. of Brevard County, Inc. v. City of Indian Harbor Beach, No. 75-2977 CA-
01-A (Fla. 18th Cir. Ct. July 2, 1976); City of Coral Springs v. Florida National
Properties, Inc., No. 76-11522 (Fla. 17th Cir. Ct. January 12, 1977) affd 358 So.2d
97 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1978) cert den 366 So.2d 880 (Fla. 1979). Note that the
appellate decision is especially instructive concerning the propriety of granting a tem-
porary restraining order to restrain further fee collections during the pendency of the
lawsuit.
256. 329 So.2d 314.
257. Id. at 321.
258. This method was used for fiscal internal control in Janis Development,
supra note 31, and in Palm Beach County, Florida Ordinance 79-7, supra note 9.
259. Palm Beach County, Florida Ordinance 79-7, supra note 9.
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individuals who have contributed revenues in the form of fees. The
funds will be spent to build roads only in the contributing residents'
particular neighborhood. Of course, all this is dependent on how local
authorities define the size of the so-called "neighborhood."
C. Who Shall Pay The Fee?
1. PURCHASERS OF UNIMPROVED AND COMMERCIAL LAND
It is apparent that a large scale subdivision after a short time will
have three (3) basic classes of land: improved residential property, un-
improved residential property, and other types of property that will be
mostly in a commercial or industrial type of zoning classification. Is it
fair to utilize a formula that will assess an impact fee against commer-
cial or industrial properties for construction of new facilities, such as
schools? Certainly no factory or store ever increased the number of
children in the public school system. Thus, they do not benefit from
these particular types of facilities. The concept of benefiting from the
fees paid is crucial in differentiating a fee from a tax, and it is crucial,
as a factor to be weighed under the rational nexus test.
An answer to this problem is posed in the case of Home Builders
Association of Greater Salt Lake v. Provo.20 The City of Provo en-
acted a $100 surcharge on water and sewer connection fees designed to
provide funds for the expansion of such a system. A homebuilders
group contested the fee on the basis that it was discriminatory, since it
assessed only a single class of people. That class consisted of new sys-
tem users. The Utah Supreme Court did not agree with this
contention.
The properties actually using the sewer system should alone pay the cost
of operation and maintenance, since expenditures for such purposes
arise soley from that use. On the other hand, all properties where ser-
vice was available, whether actually using the service or not, should pay
for the construction and installation expense from which every property
has received some benefit and increase in value.21
260. 28 Utah 2d 402, 503 P.2d 451 (1972).
261. Id. at 452 citing Airwick Industries, Inc. v. Carlstadt Sewerage Authority,
57 N.J. 107, 270 A.2d 18 (1970).
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It can be argued that commercial and industrial properties don't di-
rectly add children to the school system but their employees do add
children to the school district. Commercial and industrial properties
pay school ad valorem taxes and presumably, impact fees would be
assessed on the same theory. The Court in the Provo City case went on
to express the view that improved properties should not be saddled
with the burden of providing something that would be of future benefit
to presently unimproved land. This would not be "equitably," a stan-
dard that the Florida Supreme Court found to be essential in the fee
assessment of Dunedin.212 The unimproved property was benefitted by
the improvement, and more specifically, the unimproved property
would benefit unfairly in respect to capital costs and interest thereon,
as may have been paid in the past by users of the improvement. 63
Therefore, it appears that some basis can be found for arguing that
even unimproved land in a subdivision or planned unit development
should be assessed something. However, it appears that most govern-
mental entities prefer to assess impact fees at the time that a building
permit is pulled. Thus, the unimproved land's fee is deferred.
2. DEVELOPERS WHO PAY ONLY To HAVE THEIR DEVELOPMENTS FAIL
Another sewerage system case that involved impact assessments
affirmed the concept of assessing the fee from developers before con-
struction of the development or of the public facility commenced. In
S.S. &O. Corporation v. Township of Bernards Sewerage Authority,26
the New Jersey Supreme Court stated that "as between the utility and
the developer, the developer may be required to provide initial financ-
ing for the (sewerage) laterals to cover the risk that the development
will fail or not bear its proper share of the costs."2 5 However, if the
development fails and is not constructed, it appears that there may be a
need to refund the money that the developer has paid to the govern-
ment for facility expansion. One reason might rest on the fact that the
need for new facilities has disappeared, since the proposed development
is never built. In Wright Development v. City of Mountain VieW266 a
262. 329 So.2d 314.
263. 484 P.2d 606.
264. 62 N.J. 369, 301 A.2d 738 (1972).
265. Id. at 747.
266. 53 Cal. App.3d 344, 125 Cal. Rptr. 721 (1975). See also 484 P.2d 606.
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fee was collected in exchange for the right to develop a group of condo-
miniums. In California a state law 7 provided that new residential unit
developments shall be required to dedicate land, pay impact fees in lieu
of dedication or dedicate land in part and pay fees in part for park or
recreational development as a condition to approval of the develop-
ment. The development was never constructed in this case, and the de-
veloper sued to obtain a refund. The California Appellate Court or-
dered the funds returned. 68
The order was apparently based on the idea that a need for new
public facilities was never created. Thus, no impact assessment was
necessary. The author believes that, if the developer had donated land
rather than paid the fee, the Court probably would have ordered it
returned on the lack of need argument. At the very least the govern-
mental entity would have been required to pay -a fair market value for
the land. The unanswered question that has not been addressed by the
courts involves the situation in which the fee is paid and the develop-
ment virtually completed when a failure occurs. Conversely, the local
governmental entity might assess the fee and enter into financial pub-
lic facility construction commitments that would have to be honored.
What happens, if the development fails? Will the courts force the fees
to be returned? A close look at the Bernards Sewerage Authority case
above might indicate otherwise, because of the requirement that the
developer must provide impact funds prior to public facility construc-
tion "to cover the risk that the development will fail .... ,1
3. FEES COLLECTED UNDER A TECHNICALLY DEFICIENT ORDINANCE
During the period between 1972 and 1974, the City of Dunedin,
Florida operated under an impact fee ordinance that permitted the City
to collect funds from its developers for the City's water and sewer facil-
ities. When it became apparent that this ordinance would not survive
the scrutiny of Florida's courts, the City enacted a revised impact fee
267. CAL. GOVT. CODE § 66477 (West, 1977). The code section indicates that the
amount and location of land to be dedicated or fees paid shall bear a reasonable rela-
tionship to facility use by future residents of the proposed development. Note the use
of the term "reasonable relationship" which was used by the California Supreme Court
in both Ayres, supra note 93, and Frisco Land, supra note 95.
268. 125 Cal. Rptr. 723.
269. See note 265 supra.
I
181 1Impact Fees1 4:1980
45
et al.: Impact Fees: National Perspectives to Florida Practice; A Review
Published by NSUWorks, 1980
1 82 Nova Law Journal 4:1980 1
ordinance270 in 1974. It provided that impact fees collected from devel-
opers could only be used to expand the City's water and sewer system.
Trust funds were established as a method. of effecting this concept. In
its landmark decision, the Florida Supreme Court approved the basic
concept enacted in 1972 by the City.211 However, the Court held the
ordinance covering the petiod between 1972 and 1974 to be technically
deficient because of its failure to properly restrict the impact fee funds
collected for public facility expansion. The Court remanded the case to
the trial court to determine the question of refunds due the various
contractors who paid impact fees under the technically deficient ordi-
nance.2 2 While the remanded case was pending, the City enacted an-
other new ordinance213 mandating that the funds collected during the
period between 1972 and 1974 would be utilized under the methodol-
ogy delineated in the 1974 ordinance. Citing Forbes Pioneer Boat Line
v. Board of Commissioners,zz4 the trial court ruled that the funds col-
lected between 1972 and 1974 had to be returned to the developers. The
Forbes case involved a Florida drainage district's efforts to collect
tolls from anyone using a canal lock controlled by the district. The
Florida Legislature realized that there was no authority for this ac-
tion, and consequently, the Legislature passed a law ratifying the toll
system. In the Forbes decision, the U.S. Supreme Court held that the
ratification of an act is void, if the ratifying authority had no power to
do the act in the first place.275 Since the drainage district was without
authority to collect tolls the ratification was plainly impossible. 26
Florida's Second District Court of Appeal distinguished the
Forbes case and reversed the trial court ruling by noting that Dunedin
had authority to collect the fees during the 1972-1974 period . 77 The
City erred in effecting an impact fee in an operation aspect. The Court
substantiated its view by citing the Florida Supreme Court version of
270. See 358 So.2d 846 and Florida Ordinance 74-19 (1974).
271. Contractors and Builders Association of Pinellas County v. City of Dune-
din, 329 So.2d 314 (Fla. 1976).
272. Id. at 322.
273. See 358 So.2d 846 and Florida Ordinance 76-16 (1976).
274. 258 U.S. 338, 66 L.Ed. 647, 42 S. Ct. 325 (1921).
275. City of Dunedin v. Contractors and Builders Ass'n of Pinellas County, 358
So.2d 846, 848 (Fla. 2nd Dist. Ct. App. 1978) cert den 370 So.2d 458 (Fla. 1979).
276. Id.
277. Id.
46
Nova Law Review, Vol. 4, Iss. 1 [1980], Art. 7
https://nsuworks.nova.edu/nlr/vol4/iss1/7
Impact Fees
the Dunedin impact fee case. In that case Justice Hatchett noted: "...
Nothing we decide, however, prevents Dunedin from adopting another
sewer connection charge ordinance, incorporating appropriate restric-
tions on the use of revenues it produces. Dunedin is at liberty, moreo-
ver, to adopt an ordinance restricting the use of moneys already col-
lected . . . ." The distinguishing point therefore was the passage of
an ordinance that restricted the funds retroactively based on the col-
lection and utilization methods specified by the Court. Since Dunedin
has passed a restrictive ordinance retroactively restricting past collec-
tions, the Appellate Court permitted the City to keep its earlier ille-
gally obtained fees.
Finally, what happens, if the requisite authority is not found to
exist? Apparently, the fees would have to be returned on somewhat the
same type of idea as expressed in Wright Development.279 However, for
litigation of this nature to wind its way through the courts could take
years during which time a developer might sell the land on which the
fees have been paid. If the property has been deeded to a new land-
owner, should the fee be returned to the developer who paid the fee or
the new owner of the land on which the fee was paid? It appears that
this question was answered some years ago in Perlmutter's, Inc. v.
Ancell.28 ° In that case a school impact fee was found to be unconstitu-
tional. Perlmutter's, Inc. had paid a fee of $125 per dwelling unit on
each of 120 units under protest. All of the units had been deeded to
new residents. Their warranty deeds made no mention of the grantees
of the owners succeeding to any rights in the fees upon a court ordered
reimbursement.21 The Court determined that the refund should be
made to the developer/grantor.
4. ExiSTING STRUCTURES AND LANDOWNERS
It seems likely that a subdivision might be approved which in-
278. 358 So.2d at 848, citing 329 So.2d at 322.
279. 125 Cal. Rptr. 723.
280. 153 Colo. 149, 385 P.2d 123 (1963).
281. It appears that it would be wise to reference any succession of rights to a
reimbursement in the warranty deed. References in a sales contract would be insuffi-
cient in most cases due to the doctrine of merger of the sales contract into the war-
ranty deed. See Volunteer Security Co. v. Dowl, 159 Fla. 767, 33 So.2d 150, 151
(1947) and Fraser v. Schoenfeld, 364 So.2d 533, 534 (Fla. 3rd Dist. Ct. App. 1978).
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cludes one or two existing structures. Since an impact fee might be
assessed at the time that a building permit is issued or a subdivision
plat approved, it is conceivable that an argument might be made as to
the invalidity of the fee. Since the owners of the existing structures
would not be assessed, it could be argued that the Equal Protection
Clause of the U.S. Constitution had been violated. This is because dif-
ferent landowners in the same subdivision were both being treated
differently while benefiting from the facility expansion. Precisely this
same argument was presented in Ivy Steel and Wire Co., Inc. v. City
of Jacksonville.8 2 The City of Jacksonville enacted an :ordinance com-
pelling those users in the downtown area of the city to pay a special
sewer system surcharge for water pollution control. The surcharge was
made effective only for new users connected to the system after August
24, 1971. A group of taxpayers brought a class action suit seeking in-
validation of the charge, as a violation of the Equal Protection Clause.
The Court upheld the city ordinance by stating:
The Equal Protection Clause does not prevent a statute or regulation
from having a beginning and thus discriminating between rights of an
earlier and later time . . . plaintiffs have not been denied equal protec-
tion so long as they are being treated the same as those similarly situ-
ated at the same time.23
Thus, it is conceivable that new structures could be assessed and
existing structures not assessed without violating the Equal Protection
Clause. However, from a policy standpoint, one could argue that all
property owners who seek to build on their land be assessed. It would
seem apparent that there is a big difference between a small land own-
er and a large scale developer. Certaintly the difference in effect on the
community insofar as a need for public faciities is concerned will be
great. The developer is the one who causes the major impact on the
community. The Equal Protection argument might permit an exemp-
tion for those small property owners who wish to build and reside on
land they own. It is conceivable that the impact formula might assess
those who build on their land for profit but not to reside. The Wald
282. 401 F. Supp. 701 (N.D. Fla. 1975).
283. Id. at 703 citing Russo v. Shapiro, 309 F. Supp. 385 (D. Conn. 1969).
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Corporationz' case presents judicial authority for distinguishing be-
tween the small landowner and the developer.
A critical distinction. . . must be drawn between the ordinary property
owner and the subdivider. Unlike one who merely reserves his property
for personal use of sale as a single tract, the subdivider profits from the
sale of lots withi subdivision The local government must consider the
welfare of the families who will be filling the development. 2 5
The Court went on to indicate that it is only reasonable to assess the
developer. This seems to leave some leaway to exempt the small prop-
erty owner from the impact fee, if he intends to reside on the land.
PREDICTION
It appears, based on the track record of the Florida Legislature,
that no impact fee enabling act will be passed in the near future. In
fact, there has been no interest in even introducing such a piece of leg-
islation within the last few years. However, the Legislature has left
statutory authority that appears to be sufficient to allow local govern-
ments to enact a fee. Such a fee would be enacted as an extension of
the police power or comprehensive planning powers. Also, based on
Wald, it appears that a fee which provides a good balance between
the desires of developers and local government would be upheld, since
Florida is a rational nexus test state.
It is clear that any local governmental entity will not have an
"easy road to hoe," because Florida Courts have not been overly re-
ceptive to the impact fee concept. However, many of the impact "fees"
that have been subjected to the scrutiny of the judiciary have actually
been taxes. Thus, the courts have been correct in invalidating these so-
called "fees." Local governmental entities that wish to enact an impact
"fee" will have to take great care to make certain that the revenues
collected are of direct benefit to the individuals paying them.
It also appears that the fees will have to be increased to an
amount of assessment far above what. has been the rule in Florida.
Small collections of impact fees only provide a small supplement to
local governmental budgets. These supplements are pitifully insufficient
284. 338 So.2d at 867.
285. Id.
85 1
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to build the type of expanded facilities that will be needed to serve the
tidal wave of new residents coming to Florida. Therefore, local officials
will not only have to bite the bullet by opposing the real estate and
construction industry, one of Florida's biggest industries, in enacting
impact fees, but local officials will have to set the fee assessment
formula high enough to collect sufficient revenues to make a meaning-
ful impact on the community.
Dramatic expansions in public facilities will be needed in all areas
of Florida from the Panhandle to the Gold Coast as Florida moves
into the 80's. In the end, developers, the Legislature, the courts, local
officials and the public will have to make the policy decision, as to
whether or not the impact fee is the proper vehicle for funding the
public facility expansion that must and will be built for new residents.
Paul Gougelman
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